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ABSTRACT		 	
The enforcement of Section 54 notices by the Department of Mineral and Resources (DMR) 
Inspector of Mines (IOM) on South African coal mines has been used as a primary tool to 
reduce the health and safety risk of mine employees. The resultant reduction of accidents 
in the mining industry is in itself a positive impact. However, the resultant stoppages 
triggered by the application of Section 54 instructions have resulted in certain cases with 
unintended impacts. There also remains a material difference between the Department of 
Labour Inspectors and the IOM.  The main difference being the enforcement guidelines; the 
guideline for the Inspector from the Department of Labour has a clause instructing the 
Inspector of possible economic consequences in exercising their duties if they do not 
sparingly enforce the law. The DMR, as well as the Mine Health and Safety Act (MHSA) , 
fail to caution the IOM in their enforcement of the law. 
Unintended consequences are resulting from the frequent issuing of Section 54 instructions 
on South African coal mines. A number of shortcomings in the process, mainly around the 
appropriateness of Section 54 notices and up until 2016 the mines chose not to act against 
the DMR, i.e. go to court on the implementation of Section 54 stoppages in disputable 
cases.   
As a comparison to the DMR’s approach regarding Section 54 instructions, approaches 
made in North America, Europe, and Australasia are reviewed.  
The second question of the dissertation is around the current effectiveness of Section 54 
instructions in reducing mine fatalities.  Most respondents indicate that Section 54 
stoppages are the most effective tool that the IOM can implement.  Almost all persons 
acknowledge the DMR’s contribution to promoting health and safety. Further, from the 
questionnaire and interviews, many of the respondents believe that Section 54 stoppages 
are fairly applied and that all parties understand the application of Section 54 instructions. 
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The majority of the respondents are of the opinion that the IOMs have the technical 
knowledge and experience to administer mine standards, yet the minority highlighted that 
the IOMs personnel lack experience, at times abuse their powers, have unrealistic 
expectations and enforce the regulation in an inconsistent manner. 
Although the majority of the respondents are of the belief that mine safety and risk could be 
managed without the use of Section 54 instructions, many respondents stated that they 
would like to see more visits from the DMR to enforce standards and to assist and 
collaborate with the mines to achieve best practice in mine standards and procedures. The 
above response suggests that the DMR has a role to play in promoting adherence to 
standards and best practices. The research also indicates that a significant number of 
respondents are not sure if the mine properly enforces their standards , which supports the 
importance of the DMR in promoting adherence to mine standards.   
The dissertation identifies the failure to comply with legislation and mine standards as the 
major reason for Section 54 stoppages and notes that the resultant impact of Section 54 
notices is the loss of production. 
Between 2005 and 2016 a sharp decline in South Africa’s mining-related fatalities has 
occurred.  However, since litigation measures were taken in 2016 against the DMR, it 
appears that Section 54 instructions cannot alone bring the mining industry to its 2020 target 
of Zero Harm.   
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1 CHAPTER	1:	INTRODUCTION	
 Chapter	overview	
This chapter provides an introduction, background, and objectives of this dissertation.  An 
introduction to the research problem provides the background of the importance of the 
research. An outline of the research problem and objectives are then presented, as well as the 
outline of the dissertation. 
 Background	
Section 54 notices under the Mine Health and Safety Act (MHSA), No. 29 of 1996 are issued 
when there is a failure to comply by the employers or management in South African mines. 
When standards, procedures or codes of practice (COP) are not complied with, an Inspector 
of Mines (IOM) from the Department of Minerals and Resources (DMR), is likely to issue 
Section 54 stoppage notice. In terms of the MHSA, an IOM only needs a “reason to believe 
that an occurrence, practice or condition at a mine endangers, or may endanger, the health or 
safety of a person at a mine" to issue a Section 54.  
 
The IOM may give any instruction necessary to protect the health and safety of a person at 
that mine.  An IOM’s instruction may result in the following scenarios: 
• Halt the operations at the mine or part of a mine. 
• Halt any act or practice at the mine or part of a mine. 
 
The employer must take steps, as set out in the instruction, or rectify the occurrence, practice 
or condition” (DMR, 2018). 
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In addition, the MHSA has Section 55 which is another provision for the IOM to direct the mines 
to comply. Tools to enforce compliance by an IOM are discussed in detail in Figure 3. Briefly, 
the difference between a Section 54 and 55 is that a Section 55 instruction from the IOM 
requires a mine owner to rectify an adverse situation  within a given timeframe without stopping 
(i.e. Section 54) an operation or an act. 
1.2.1 Minerals	Act	of	1991	and	the	Mines	and	Works	Act	of	1956	
The Acts before the MHSA namely the Minerals Act of 1991 under Section 27(1) and the Mines 
and Works Act No. 27 of 1956 under Section 3(1) did provide the Mines Inspectorate authority 
to implement mine stoppages for substandard acts that could affect the safety of persons 
(RSA, 1991; RSA, 1956). However, no literature has been found to quantify any stoppages or 
any general outcry from mine operators that may have been affected by stoppages enforced 
by the Mines Inspectorate prior to the introduction of Section 54 notices/stoppages. 
1.2.2 The	number	of	South	African.	Mining	Fatalities	
The South African mining fatalities have decreased over the years. In 1956 there were 816 
mine fatalities, decreasing to 604 fatal accidents in 1991, and 246 mine fatalities in 2004.  In 
2004, the South African mining industry had a fatality rate three times as high as the United 
States of America (USA) and six times higher than other first world countries such as Canada 
and Australia (Figure 1). With such a high fatality rate, the Department of Mineral Resources 
(DMR) opted to utilise the vigorous enforcement of Section 54 as a means to address the 
abnormally high South African fatality rate. From 2007 to 2018 (Figure 2), the fatality numbers 
has shown a steady decline with the fatality numbers minimising at 73 fatalities in 2016 with a 
creep upwards in 2017 and 2018 recording 88 and 81 fatalities (Letsoalo, 2019) respectively, 
illustrating that Section 54 stoppages may have played a role in reducing mining-related 
fatalities over the past 12 years.  However, questions remain whether Section 54s have served 
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their purpose and that some other intervention is required to progress South Africa’s safety 
record to an international benchmark of fewer than 0,10 fatalities per 1 million hours worked. 
 
Figure 1: South African Mining Industry Fatalities 2004 to 2016 (COM, 2017b) 
 
Figure 2: Number of fatalities by industry 2007 to 2018 (adapted from DMR, 2018) 
 
Notably, in 2017, only 1% of the Section 54s issued resulted in total mine closure, 99% of all 
Section 54 instructions were for partial closure with most of the total closures associated with 
small privately-operated mines. Transgressions included no occupational hygiene 
documentation, employees without medical certificates, no personal protective equipment 
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provided to employees, no mandatory COP, and no legal appointments in place. Thus, 
indicating the DMR has been cognisant of mining industry complaints that total mine stoppages 
should be reduced.   
 
Section 54s issuance was increased from 2005 when there were 200 fatalities (DMR, 2018), 
since then there has been a noticeable decline in the number of mining fatalities as indicated 
in Table 1. 
Table 1: South Africa mine fatalities 2005 to 2018 
 
South African mine fatalities from 2005 to 2018 
Gold Coal Platinum Others TOTAL 
2005 105 2005 16 2005 47 2005 32 200 
2006 114 2006 20 2006 40 2006 26 200 
2007 114 2007 15 2007 53 2007 37 219 
2008 85 2008 20 2008 36 2008 29 170 
2009 81 2009 18 2009 41 2009 27 167 
2010 62 2010 12 2010 34 2010 19 127 
2011 51 2011 12 2011 37 2011 23 123 
2012 53 2012 11 2012 28 2012 20 112 
2013 37 2013 7 2013 27 2013 22 93 
2014 44 2014 9 2014 16 2014 15 84 
2015 33 2015 5 2015 21 2015 19 78 
2016 30 2016 4 2016 28 2016 11 73 
2017 39 2017 10 2017 27 2017 12 88 
2018 38 2018 9 2018 9 2018 20 76 
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1.2.3 Chamber	of	Mines	comments	on	Section	54	stoppages	
The Minerals Council of South Africa (MCSA) (previously known as the Chamber of Mines 
(COM, 2016) in 2016 commended the coal mining industry’s safety performance. Remarks 
by MCSA President, Roger Baxter state: - “We commend the coal industry for its continued 
improvement in safety performance. The then Minister of Mineral Resources Mosebenzi 
Zwane congratulated 16 companies for operating without any fatalities for a period of more 
than 12 months at the annual announcement of safety statistics in Pretoria in January this 
year.  Five of these companies were coal-mining companies including Exxaro, Sasol, Total 
Coal South Africa, Kuyasa Mining and Coal of Africa. The performance of these companies 
indicates that the industry’s goal of Zero Harm1 is achievable.”  
 
The MCSA (COM, 2016) has highlighted that there have been instances of inappropriate 
issuance of Section 54 instructions since 2007. These cases of inappropriate issuance of 
Section 54 have affected the economic viability of many operations resulting in job losses. 
The MCSA makes an example of a recent Labour Court judgment against DMR officials in 
which the Labour Court points out that Section 54 stoppage should be proportional to the 
possible harm it is issued to prevent (COM, 2016).  
 
According to the MCSA, Section 54 stoppages did cost the South African mining industry 
R4.8 billion in 2015 (COM, 2016). The MCSA observed that marginal producing shafts in 
the Rustenburg area were further burdened by Section 54 stoppages and lost production 
                                                             
1 The enforcement of Section 54 is part of the overall strategy of creating a mining industry with “zero harm” 
(Africa, 2018) but, like any good intention, there are good and bad impacts. “Zero harm” is a collective 
strategy by the South African mining industry to ensure a zero fatality rate by December 2020 (Mining 
Review Africa, 2019) 
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days.  The MCSA’s Platinum Leadership Forum, a forum made up of CEOs of platinum 
mining companies, developed a proposed guideline incorporating the following:  
• Reducing Section 54 stoppage time.  
• Encouraging the use of Section 55 by the IOM since Section 55 instructions avoid 
stoppages.  
• Encourage more interactions with organised labour. 
• Focus on training and scaling out small non-compliance issues from Section 54 
stoppage instructions. The proposed guideline was shared with the Chief Inspector 
of Mines in September 2016, and the MCSA reports that no comments were 
received from the Chief Inspector of Mines.  
 
Figure 3 shows the DMR Enforcement Pyramid, which is an enforcement guideline. In the 
same guideline, an IOM has a number of tools at his/her disposal to use in the enforcement of 
MHSA. The issuance of Section 54s appears to be the enforcement tool of choice by IOM, as 
it is an enforcement tool that stops work. Hence, there is an immediate response by 
management to rectify non-compliance issues to resume production as soon as possible. 
 
 
7 
 
 
Figure 3: DMR Enforcement Pyramid (DMR, 2011) 
 
The Enforcement Pyramid gives an assortment of tools at the IOMs disposal to enforce the 
MHSA as it would apply for different situations as the IOM visits mines. The Enforcement 
Pyramid tools are: 
• Information and Education which entails documents from DMR being sent to 
stakeholders and meetings with stakeholders. 
• Withdrawal of approvals given in terms of MHSA, such as permissions or 
exemptions granted to the mines by the DMR. Depending upon the identified 
shortcomings in health and safety standards, such approvals can be modified or 
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withdrawn. These approvals usually deal with temporarily removing an onerous 
piece of legislation that hinders effective mining at a particular mine. 
• Orders to comply, this is when an IOM issues a Section 55 written instruction to the 
employer and does not stop operations but specifies what needs to be rectified 
within a specified time determined by the IOM. 
• Section 54 stoppage, IOM instructs the employer to stop operations or to stop acts 
or act, until certain conditions set by the IOM have been met. 
• Administrative fine, this fine is issued by the IOM to the employer of a mine. This 
fine is only issued to the employer and not the workers and is for legal breaches that 
are not referred to the prosecuting authority. 
• Statutory certificate suspension, in this instance an IOM may recommend that the 
Chief Inspector of Mines suspends or cancels an individual’s certificate issued in 
terms of the MHSA if that individual has acted or is acting in a way that endangers 
the health and safety of themselves or others. 
• Prosecution, in situations where an IOM believes an individual has committed an 
offence he/she will refer the matter to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) for 
prosecution. 
• Rights suspension or cancellation, this is when a right, such as a mining right, is 
cancelled by the Minister of Minerals and Resources in terms of the MPRDA, 2002. 
The mining right can be cancelled in terms of MPRDA if the mine does not comply 
with the MHSA, as compliance with the MHSA is one of the conditions for the 
granting of the right. 
 
There are various transgressions that lead to the issuance of Section 54s. Figure 4 shows an 
analysis of different transgressions that were issued by the IOMs in November 2016.  The 
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transgressions that top the list fall under “General”, “Trackless Mobile Machinery” (TMM), “Poor 
Supervision” and “Support”. Transgressions under the “General” category can be described as 
poor housekeeping, for example, partial flooding of roadways or workplaces. The areas of 
transgression found in November 2016 are very similar to the top four areas of Section 54s 
that were issued for 2017 (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 4: Section 54 transgressions reported for November 2016 (DMR, 2017) 
 
Figure 5 depicts the main areas where Section 54s were issued. The category of “General” 
(17%), “Poor Supervision” (17%), “TMM” (12%), “Support” (8%), and “Winches” (7%) 
representing the top five (61%).   
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Figure 5: Section 54 Instructions issued for 2017 (DMR, 2019) 
 
Figure 6 indicates the recent change by the DMR to provide less detail regarding the number 
of Section 54s issued. Figure 6 also indicates the preference in 2018 to use Section 55s, opting 
for partial mine closures instead of total closures and the administration of Section 54s. Total 
closures are 1%, representing predominantly small mines who were operating without legal 
documents as required by the MHSA, documents like workers medical surveillance or training 
records (DMR, 2019). 
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Figure 6: Section 54 instruction issued total closure vs partial closure (DMR, 2019) 
 
The above change towards the issuance of Section 55s represent the mining industries 
reluctance to over regulate Section 54s which negatively impacted on the mines’ revenue. 
Table 2 displays data sourced from research conducted by Pearton (2015) on the impacts of 
Section 54 notices, and indicate some of the financial impacts that the South African mining 
industry has endured in the recent past.   
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Table 2: Impact of Section 54s on gold mine revenue (Pearton, 2015) 
Description Value 
Value per panel 
Panel length (m) 30 
Panel height (m) 1.2 
Drilled length (m) 1.13 
Volume per blast (m3) 40.6 
Rock density (t/m3) 2.7 
Tonnes per blast (t) 110 
Recovered grade (g/t) 6.0 
Gold recovered per blast (kg) 0.658 
Gold price ($/oz) 1260 
Exchange rate (R:$) 10.20 
Value per blast (R) 271 766 
Loss of Revenue – Section 54s 
Blasts per year (per panel) 192 
Revenue per year (per panel)  
(R’ million) 
52.2 
Lost blasts per Section 54 (per panel) 3 
Lost in annual revenue per Section 54 R815 298 1.6% 
Loss of Revenue – Blast Performance 
1% failure of blasts as % of explosives R2718 106% 
1 cm loss in advance as % of explosive R2265 88% 
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The MCSA as shown in Table 3, also researched the impacts of Section 54 on losses of 
revenue on four platinum mines operating in the North West province and one mine operating 
in the Limpopo province.  
. 
Table 3: Platinum mini-survey – January 2015 to the end of June 2016 (COM, 2017b) 
 2015 2016 
No. of safety stoppages 160 77 
No. of days affected 698 246 
Lost ounces 132 000 
Reduced foreign earnings R2.3 billion 
Reduced company tax R657 million 
Reduced indirect taxes R19 million 
 
Since 2010, Health and Safety have been added in the Mining Charter. The Mining Charter 
was enacted with one goal to transform the mining industry in all aspects, which, as of the 
2010 Mining Charter, includes Health and Safety as part of the transformation process. Section 
54 can be seen as also a tool to manage the health and safety risk in mining. Certainly, the 
application of Section 54s has played a significant role in this transformation process in terms 
of health and safety, as the mining industry has seen a substantial reduction in fatalities that 
could have been a result of Section 54s and is discussed in more detail in Section 2.2 of this 
dissertation. The enforcement of Section 54 is part of the overall strategy of creating a mining 
industry with “zero harm” (Africa, 2018) but, like any good intention, there are good and bad 
impacts. Zero harm strategy is a leading indicator in the reduction of accidents, goals are set 
as “zero harm” and the industry leadership commits to the goal by doing risk assessments and 
putting efficient controls to mitigate mining hazards.  
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This dissertation will investigate the impacts, both positive and negative aspects of Section 54 
mine stoppages. 
 
 Problem	statement		
The enforcement of Section 54 by the DMR Inspectorate on South African coal mines is used 
as a primary tool to eliminate or reduce the health and safety risk for mine employees. The 
resultant reduction of accidents in the mining industry is in its self a positive impact.  
 
The resultant stoppages triggered by the application of Section 54s results in the loss of 
production and revenue at the mine, which result in losses in the South African economy due 
to the reduction in revenue and associated taxes, as well as other unintended impacts such as 
a reduction in social and community development.  
 
Herbert Spencer (IZQuotes, 2019) said “every cause produces more than one effect”, which 
means the increased usage of Section 54s not only has reduced accidents on the mines but 
also has other effects on the mining industry.  This dissertation has to find answers to that 
question. 
 Objectives	of	the	research			
The objective of the dissertation is to assess the negative impacts of Section 54 on the South 
African coal mines and the unintended consequences on the coal mines, its workforce, 
management, and other interested and affected parties. 
Case studies to gather quantitative and qualitative data was undertaken from collieries referred 
to as A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O,P,Q,R and S. In addition, data was gathered 
from the DMR Gauteng and Mpumalanga offices. 
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 The	main	research	questions	
The research will answer the following question:  
1. “What are the unintended consequences resulting from the frequent issuing of 
Section 54s on South African coal mines.”  
 
A subsequent question is also raised: 
2.  “Are Section 54s still effective in reducing mine fatalities.” 
 
 The	significance	and	justification	of	the	study	
Gloy (2014) has written a dissertation on Section 54 mine stoppages. In her dissertation, she 
examines the proportionality of the Department of Labour Inspector and the IOM from the 
DMR, as they enforce compliance with the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) and 
the MHSA respectively. Gloy (2014) observed that there is a difference between the 
Department of Labour Inspectors and the IOM.  The main difference being the enforcement 
guidelines; the guideline for the Inspector from the Department of Labour has a clause 
instructing the Inspector of possible economic consequences in exercising their duties if they 
do not sparingly enforce the law. Neither the MHSA nor the guidelines caution the IOM in 
his/her enforcement of the Section 54. 
 
The application of Section 54 has raised the attention to many other research bodies and 
academics; for example, Professor May Hermanus, former Chief IOM, has requested the 
mining industry stakeholders to have a debate on the effectiveness of Section 54 (Solomons, 
2016). 
 
 
 
16 
In November 2016: “The Labour Court (Johannesburg) ruled that the DMR officials had ignored 
the notion of “proportionality” when it comes to issuing Section 54 notice, shutting AngloGold 
Ashanti’s Kopanang mine on the 17th October 2016. The mine lost R9.5 million per day owing 
to Section 54 orders that had been issued by an IOM (Stevens, 2016). 
 The	locality	of	the	research		
The research is covering the South African coal mining industry focusing on the main producing 
areas of Witbank, Highveld, Ermelo, and Somkhele coalfields (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7: Coalfields of South Africa (Snyman, 1998) 
 Study 
Area  
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 Research	methodology		
A combination of qualitative and quantitative research was undertaken.  A literature review 
regarding Section 54s was undertaken to highlight some of the impacts that Section 54 have 
on the South African mining industry as a whole. In addition to the literature review, several 
interviews and case studies were conducted with the following collieries as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: List of collieries used for interviews and case studies 
Mine Mine Mine 
A H N 
B I O 
C J P 
D K Q 
E L R 
F M S 
G   
 
Additional data was gathered from the DMR Gauteng and Mpumalanga offices to enable 
quantitative information to be collected and analysed. Further interviews with key stakeholders 
enabled qualitative data to be sourced and analysed. 
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 Applicability	of	the	Research	
The research intends to investigate the impacts Section 54 stoppages in the South African coal 
industry and analyse them to determine if there are any unintended consequences, of which if 
these unintended consequences exist, recommendations can be made to key stakeholders of 
the mining industry; which are the DMR, MCSA and organised labour.  
 Outline	of	the	dissertation		
Chapter 1 provides an introduction, background, an outline of the study; its aims and 
applicability. Chapter 2 presents the literature review, which investigates the importance and 
impact of Section 54 mine closure on mine owners, mine employees, local communities, and 
the South African government. Chapter 3 of the dissertation deals with the research 
methodology, which is a mixed method of both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Chapter 
4 examines and interprets the findings of the research and presents the unintended 
consequences that Section 54s have on the South African coal industry, Chapter 5 
summarises the dissertation research findings and discussions. Chapter 6 provides 
recommendations and conclusions for the dissertation, and the dissertation finishes with a 
bibliography, an appendix, and a glossary, which are considered as supplementary materials. 
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2 CHAPTER	2:	LITERATURE	REVIEW	
 Chapter	Overview		
This chapter searches existing literature to support the problem statement, the objectives of 
the research, the main research question and the significance and justification of the study. 
The impact, relevance, and cost of Section 54s are investigated as well as understanding the 
proportionality when IOMs exercise their power to issue Section 54 notices.  An international 
literature review has been undertaken to examine the similarities and differences between 
foreign mine Inspectorates and the South African DMR Inspectorate. The objective of the 
literature review of North American, European and Australasian experiences is to benchmark 
how mine officials apply their equivalent administrative actions of Section 54s in their 
respective countries.   
 The	impact	of	Section	54s		
Stewart (1995) stated that legislation is put in place with good intentions to address issues of 
health and safety on mines, but unfortunately, unintended impacts result in “reduced 
productivity”, “increased working costs” and “cause job losses”. Fundamentally, safety 
improvement is driven by safe mining methods, safe routines, and safe work execution. Key 
factors in achieving improved safety in mines are the use of the safest mining methods, work 
practices, and good engineering practice (Stewart, 1995). It therefore means from Stewart 
(1995), that good legislation should be geared to excellence in mining environments, practices, 
and adoption of new scientific discoveries.  
 
The mining industry needs to keep alive collective commitments of creating an industry that 
does not harm the workers nor negatively impact on the health and safety of the workforce.  
Stewart and Malatji (2018) reminds the mining industry of two commitments; firstly the 2003 
and 2013 MHSC milestones in which the mine owners, government and organised labour 
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committed to zero harm. Secondly, the CEOs of major companies have made a public 
commitment to zero harm in 2005.  The mining industry has more tools at their disposal to 
manage mining risk and Section 54 administration is just one of those tools used to achieve 
the zero harm goal. It is incumbent for the MHSC to keep liaison amongst its stakeholders on 
what risk controls to be used so as to eliminate the over reliance of Section 54 mine stoppages 
 
UASA (2011) states that although it has acknowledged that Section 54 prevents fatal accidents 
they still feel that Section 54s are applied recklessly, hence causing more harm to the 
economy. The UASA has calculated that on average a one-day Section 54 stoppage on a mine 
equates to R6 million revenue loss to a production section.  The UASA (2011) further reported 
Anglo American Platinum in the last quarter of 2011 experienced at least one shaft closure 
every third day due to Section 54 mine stoppages. UASA Divisional Manager believed that 
Section 54s should be administered by balancing safety with profits for mine sustainability 
(UASA, 2011). 
 
The suspension of the 2011 Enforcement Guidelines by the Labour Court has not helped in 
the lessening of the inconsistent application of Section 54s by the DMR Inspectorate. Since 
2016 mine operators who would usually hold discussions with the DMR regarding Section 54 
stoppages are now choosing to approach the courts for adjudication (UASA, 2011).  This could 
be the same mine operators perceiving Section 54 as being applied un-proportionally. 
 
McKay (2016) reported that the MCSA wants to see safety legislation applied so that a mine 
section is closed rather than the entire mine.  Thus, address safety concerns while at the same 
time reduce the impact of safety stoppages.   This type of Section 54 is described as partial 
closure (Figure 6). Even a better measure would be the issuances of Section 55s, which 
enables the IOM to issue an instruction to fix noncompliant matters rather than stop an entire 
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section or shaft with a Section 54 notice. The difference between Section 54 and 55 is 
described under 1.2 of this dissertation. “In most cases, the issuing of Section 55s, in the first 
instance, will resolve the safety issue, without harming production or the viability of the mining 
operation,” according to the MCSA and as reported by McKay (2016). It wants to ensure that 
Section 54s are “lifted expeditiously and that the DMR urgently completes an “enforcement 
policy” in order to ensure fairer and more appropriate application of the MHSA.  
According to McKay (2016), “Section 54s enable the DMR to close the entire mine and shafts 
in the event of a safety breach, most seriously when there is a mine fatality. The notion behind 
the section is for remedial action to be undertaken to avoid a repeat. There is also an economic 
impact which acts as a negative incentive to improve safety.” 
 
In December 2015, there was evidence that the DMR was taking a far stricter stance on safety 
when the DMR’s North West office issued a directive to shut every single one of the province’s 
platinum mines following underground fatalities at the mines of Royal Bafokeng Platinum and 
Impala Platinum (McKay, 2016). 
• There does seem to be a regional bias in terms of how mine safety is vetted, for 
example in 2016 AngloGold Ashanti complained of mass audits being conducted by 
IOM on its West Wits mines. Peter Steenkamp, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
Harmony Gold, confirmed this when he was quoted to state the following - “No, we 
haven’t had really seen an increase in the instances of stoppages owing to Section 
54s. We have had some. But we mostly mine in the Free State province” (McKay 
2016). 
 
As reported by McKay (2016), the MCSA reported that the application of Section 54 mine 
stoppages cost the mining industry R4.84 billion in 2015.  McKay also reported that in the 
period from 2012 to 2015 the mines reporting to the MCSA lost a total of R13.63 billion in 
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revenues due to Section 54 instructions. However, notably for the same period, the number of 
fatalities were reduced by 44%. Mackay (2016) concluded that the economic losses to the 
mines were being used as a deterrent to prevent mine fatalities, which equated to an average 
revenue loss of R13 million per Section 54 stoppage and excludes associated costs, such as 
wages without production and re-start costs.  During this period, the typical length of a Section 
54 stoppage averaged between five and 14 days, which meant an affected mine only achieved 
22/23 workdays (out of 30/31 working days) in a month. For a marginal mine that requires 19 
or 20 days per month to achieve breakeven the issuance of a Section 54 notice or instruction 
has a major impact on a mine’s profitability (McKay, 2016). Interestingly, the study didn’t 
question the integrity of Section 54 notices but questioned its application. 
 
Financial losses are difficult to contain when Section 54 stoppages affect the entire operation, 
i.e. the entire mine is stopped for infringement instead of only stopping the offending section 
(McKay 2016). In the article, McKay (2016) advocated that the DMR should have an 
“enforcement policy” that will help in alleviating adverse financial impacts associated with the 
administration of Section 54. However, one must also note that fatal accidents have reduced 
from 615 in 1993 to 78 in 2015, providing a greater belief to the DMR and IOM that Section 54 
is a useful tool to eliminate fatalities. A directive validated this belief in 2015 from the DMR 
North West office that stated that all platinum mines would be closed after fatal accidents at 
two of the platinum companies in the province.  This directive was later withdrawn (McKay, 
2016).  
 
An example of the potential misuse of Section 54s was a rumour in 2015 that claimed that 
mines which were not receptive to issuing contracts to a Gupta company, JIC Mining, a 
company associated with the Gupta’s contracting company, were receiving unwarranted 
Section 54 mine stoppages (McKay, 2016). 
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McKay (2016) also reported that a platinum Chief Executive Officer remarked that the DMR’s 
IOMs lacked practical experience as in many instances where Section 54 was issued the 
Section 54s were later changed to Section 55s after representations were made to a local 
Principal IOM working for the DMR. 
 
DMR was persuaded by the trade union United Association of South Africa (UASA) and the 
MCSA to review guidelines for issuing Section 54 after a report showed Section 54 mine 
stoppages cost the mines R4.6 billion in lost revenues in 2015 (Riddle, 2017). Riddle (2017) 
argues that many of the Section 54 instructions could have preferably been administered 
through Section 55s, which does not stop mine operations but instead requires the mine to 
rectify the substandard condition(s).  
 
Section 54s have been recklessly issued, the Kopaneng gold mine being an example of such.  
In October 2016, where a Section 54 notice was issued in a section of the mine because of a 
single substandard condition. The resultant impact was that the Kopaneng mine lost R9.5 
million per day and in such an instance a Section 55 notice would have been more appropriate 
and financial losses could have been avoided (Riddle, 2017). 
 
The importance of good health and safety standards on mines cannot be underestimated, 
however, the effective use of Section 54 notices will also require appropriate training to both 
IOMs and mine employees so that fair administration of Section 54 notices can be adopted by 
the DMR (Riddle, 2017). 
 
In the article “Is DMR deliberately sabotaging mining industry” by Jeffery (2017), Section 54 
stoppages are viewed as symptoms associated with the history of the mining industry.  Rising 
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operational costs and injurious legislation has seen the loss of at least 100 000 jobs in the 
South African mining industry in the last seven years. There seems to be an assumption by 
some people in the mining industry that mines will not stop dangerous operations on their own 
will unless forced to do so by IOM Section 54 stoppages.  By 2015 about 60% of mining 
companies had seen steep increases in Section 54s stoppages in the previous four years 
(Jeffery, 2017) of which R13.6 billion was lost in revenue.  
Some senior mining executives see prolonged Section 54s stoppages as “vindictiveness 
practice”, they point out the belief that standing against unfair Section 54 stoppages will result 
in “you get bullied”, “you get audited”, and “you get stopped to death” (Jeffery, 2017). Jeffery 
(2017) also highlights two court cases namely “Bert’s Bricks case in 2010” and “AngloGold 
Ashanti case in 2016” in which the companies challenged Section 54 stoppages on their works 
as examples were judgement picked up that the IOM enforcement of Section 54 had been 
irrational. Jeffery (2017) reported that in six months, AngloGold Ashanti in 2016 had lost 
R834m in revenues due to Section 54.  
 
Weissenberg in 2016, as quoted by Jeffery (2017) points out that some Section 54s are petty, 
such as the issues of first aid boxes, faulty vehicle lights, and incomplete paperwork. 
Weissenberg further stated that Section 54 stoppages are a symptom of a “government that is 
hostile to the mining industry” because of the industry’s history of unfairly exploiting natural 
resources and poorly treating black workers, which makes the IOMs feel morally right to issue 
Section 54s. Meaning Section 54s are a symptom of unhealed wounds. 
 
As illustrated later in Figure 6 and Figure 7, the Section 54  data provided  by the DMR Gauteng 
and Mpumalanga offices confirm the surge in Section 54 issuances for mine stoppages. The 
surge in use of Section 54 notices is a tool that has a high financial impact and might be 
perceived by the recipients of such notices as a form of punishment.  According to Karson 
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(2014), punishment fails to change behaviour but pushes people to avoid the source of 
punishment which would mean finding ways to avoid Section 54s and not dealing with the root 
cause of the mine failing to comply with health and safety standards. The surge of Section 54s 
can also be viewed as a means to force compliance. Forne (2016) stated that in enforcement 
by state agents there is a link between forced compliance and corruption. McKay (2018) 
reported that the minister of minerals and resources suspended an official in the Witbank DMR 
office for abusing Section 54 stoppages. The same IOM who had issued a Section 54 to a 
colliery asked for a payment of R50000 to lift the stoppage (McKay, 2018). The Witbank DMR 
office is situated in the coal mining region where the impacts of Section 54 stoppages are being 
studied. 
 
 Cost	implications	of	Section	54s	
Section 54s notices can result in the stoppage of an operation up to 14 days or more.  This 
stoppage can have serious financial consequences for an operation.  It is postulated that it is 
the cost implication that gains the attention of executives and senior management, thus 
increasing the safety awareness and compliance with mine standards. Preventive actions such 
as in-stope roof bolting and stope safety nets are initiatives that have been implemented in 
response to improve safety on the mines and reduce the financial impacts of Section 54s. 
 
Findings from the MCSA in 2016 and reported in McKay (2016) revealed that Section 54s 
stoppages in 2015 resulted in the mining industry losing R4.84 billion in revenue. The financial 
impact of Section 54s undoubtedly impacts the mine’s bottom line and sometimes acts as a 
deterrent to unsafe acts on the mines. The projected cost on the mines excludes other costs, 
for example, wages paid to workers who will not be at work, care and maintenance during 
stoppages, and the cost of restarting operations.  
 
 
26 
 
An example of the impact of Section 54s stoppages can be provided by Tharisa Chrome Mine’s 
experience in 2015. Based on Tharisa’s Annual Report (Cyprus, 2015), Tharisa reported that 
all mining and production was stopped due to the issuance of a Section 54 notice by the IOM. 
The Tharisa experience demonstrates how Section 54 notices can impact on production and 
capital expenditure. The Tharisa annual report highlighted how the completion test, a 
requirement by lenders was delayed by 12 months due to a Section 54 stoppage. 
 
Some views have been expressed within the mining industry that Section 54 stoppages are 
not necessarily helping to improve health and safety as the focus is on avoidance and not 
necessarily towards improving standards of health and safety. Also, it is claimed that 
stoppages affect the entire mine instead of being selectively applied to the offending workplace 
(Badenhorst, 2016). 
 
 The	Relevance	of	Section	54s	
There are two views regarding the issuances of Section 54s in the mining industry.  On one 
side it is clear that Section 54s may have played a large part in the improvement of health and 
safety at underground mines.  On the other side is the complaint that many Section 54s 
stoppages are inaccurately administered and come at the high price in the loss of production 
and revenue. 
 
In the MCSA Integrated Annual Report (IAR) 2013/14 (2015) there is mention that the mining 
industry is at critical crossroads as Section 54 stoppages have become more of a challenge in 
2014 than was the case the previous year.  By 2016, Section 54 Instructions had gained the 
spotlight and the MCSA 2016 IAR (COM, 2016) commented on the appropriate application of 
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mine stoppages (Section 54s).  The MCSA’s documentary on the “Appropriate Application of 
Section 54s” is provided below in italics.  It is included in its entirety as it succinctly provides 
the feelings and frustration of a mining industry that was fed up with the inappropriate 
application of Section 54 notices.   
 
“While the Chamber and its members recognise the important safety supervisory roles played 
by mines inspectors, we are also convinced that the inspectors’ applications of costly Section 
54 work stoppages should be proportionate to the infraction. Unfortunately, this has not always 
been the case and has led to wholesale closures of mines where transgressions were confined 
to small parts of their operations.  
 
The Chamber is committed to zero harm whereby every mineworker returns from work 
unharmed every day. Through tireless efforts by government, employers and employees, mine 
fatalities reduced from 615 in 1993 to 73 in 2016, an 88% reduction.  
 
The Chamber supports appropriate Section 54 instructions that empower inspectors to close 
parts of, or entire mines, for health and safety reasons. However, the Chamber remains 
concerned about disproportionate Section 54 instructions that have been issued since 2007. 
These affect the viability of many mines and their ability to sustain jobs. A recent Labour Court 
judgment against DMR officials stated that a Section 54 instruction must be proportional to the 
harm or potential harm that it intends to prevent, quoting an author on law who said ‘... one 
ought not use a sledgehammer to crack a nut’. The inspector had inspected a small portion of 
the mine and instructed the whole mine to be closed.  
 
The Chamber estimated that Section 54 instructions cost the industry some R4.8 billion in 
2015. The Chamber’s concerns are particularly around the North West, Rustenburg area, 
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where inappropriate or disproportionate Section 54s are adding to the woes of a significant 
number of platinum producing shafts that are already loss-making. The primary drivers of this 
impact are the direct production days lost due to Section 54 stoppages and the indirect losses 
that result from the slow upliftment process and the subsequent start-ups. 
  
While a number of companies are resorting to costly court action, the Chamber’s Platinum 
Leadership Forum (PLF) consisting of CEOs of platinum mining companies, developed a 
practical protocol to guide the appropriate application of Section 54 instructions.  
 
The protocol contains proposals to deal with challenges that make Section 54 applications both 
ineffective in enhancing health and safety and that render them value destructive, such as:  
a) Reducing the duration of Section 54 stoppages.  
b) Assessing the applicability of Section 55 (an instruction that avoids stoppage 
of operations) versus Section 54 and/or other instruments.  
c) Reducing the extent of Section 54 stoppages.  
d) Interacting appropriately with organised labour.  
e) Assessing the applicability of training as remedial action.  
f) Limiting the impact of small defects and administrative issues.  
 
The practical protocol has been shared and discussed with the Acting Chief Inspector of Mines 
since September 2016 with regular follow ups, though with no response as yet. During 
November 2016, this ‘disproportionality’ was challenged in the Labour Court by AngloGold 
Ashanti after its entire Mponeng mine was closed by an inspector who had found a few 
relatively minor localised infractions that posed no serious threats to the safety of employees 
in the small section of the Mponeng mine, or in the mine as a whole. In finding in favour of the 
company – that the inspector’s closure order, as well as the penalty imposed were 
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disproportionate – the Court established important legal principles. An inspector, the Court 
ruled, may only close an entire mine if he or she has objective reason to believe that 
occurrences and conditions identified, endangered, or may endanger, the health and safety of 
any person at an entire mine, and not only of a portion of the mine. It is hoped that this case 
will lead to greater clarity between mines, the DMR and its inspectorate.  
 
A further legal challenge by another Chamber member, Sibanye, in the first month of 2017 was 
made on the basis that the closure of its Kroondal platinum mine in August 2016 was 
unwarranted. The company has lodged a claim against the Mineral Resources Minister and 
certain DMR inspectors in their personal capacities for an estimated production loss totaling 
R26 million.  
 
In March 2017, the Chamber hosted a workshop aimed at empowering training and 
occupational health and safety (OHS) managers on the interpretation of Sections 54 and 55 of 
the MHSA. The Chamber has since tabled the workshop recommendation to the MHSC that 
this training be extended to other OHS managers, inspectors and organised labour's shop 
stewards. It is envisaged that Section 54/55 training will empower tripartite stakeholders to 
have a common understanding on the interpretation and implementation of Section 54s and 
55s, thus building the much-needed trust in this area of mine health and safety”.  
 
The MCSA (2016b) highlighted the industry’s concerns around Section 54s on what it 
described as haphazard Section 54 stoppages, as the stoppages were incorrectly 
administrated, and the duration of the stoppage was unnecessarily long. Hence, the industry 
is seeking a dialogue with the DMR’s inspectorate. 
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Section 54 stoppages contribute to production losses of platinum and gold. MCSA (2017c) 
revealed that 35% of Section 54 issued in 2015 in the mining industry should have been 
Section 55. At the MCSA workshop, it was stated that Section 55 is less severe as compared 
to Section 54, as it requires remedial action without the complete work stoppage required by 
Section 54. The significance of 35% of Section 54 will be discussed in Chapter 4. In this 
workshop, it is also mentioned that mines are hesitant to use legal actions for “unjust” Section 
54 issuance because of “various reasons” and the fear of retribution by IOMs.  The workshop 
further revealed a greater need for training on the understanding of Section 54 and Section 55 
for mineworkers (safety representatives, miners, team leaders, shift bosses and mine 
managers), and the Mines Inspectorate. There was also a general agreement by the mining 
industry participants at the workshop that the mine operators should be more legally prepared 
with a court action to counter the surge of Section 54 stoppages and to coerce Mines 
Inspectorate in a dialogue on Section 54 issuance. Also, at the workshop, suggestions were 
made that the Mine Health and Safety Council (COM, 2017c) make mandatory training for all 
its stakeholders on the implementation of the MHSA.   
 
 Litigation		
Creamer (2012) quoted the current minister of finance, Mr. Tito Mboweni as saying the 
application of Section 54 by the Inspectors of Mines is a “sledgehammer” practice that could 
result in “regulating the industry to death”. 
 
Pavlovic (2017) summarises lessons learned from the judgement of AngloGold Ashanti Limited 
vs. Mbonambi and Others in 2016; in that the Inspectors of Mines instructions in terms of 
Section 54: 
• Must be lawful, appropriate and fair. 
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• The Inspectors of Mine’s judgement to issue Section 54 instruction must be 
impersonal. 
• A mine employer can seek an urgent court interdict to lift a Section 54 instruction if 
the instruction has procedural unfairness in being administered by the Inspectors of 
Mines. 
 
There is a noticeable change in the administration of Section 54 by DMR after the AngloGold 
Ashanti Limited, Labour Court judgement on the DMR in November 2016, to manage the 
negative impacts and also to lessen the risk of litigation from mines: -  
• Total shut down of mines due to Section 54 by IOM has decreased and total 
stoppages mostly limited to small scale mines. 
• Section 54 instructions have become isolated to limited work areas or acts of sub-
standard. 
• The statistical numbers of Section 54 issued by DMR disappeared from the public 
domain and have been replaced by percentages. 
 
An example of how Section 54 stoppages may affect the viability of a mining operation is best 
described in an incident that took place in 2016 at Sibanye Platinum’s Kroondal mine.  A 
Section 54 instruction from the Inspector of Mines to suspend operations for Kroondal’s five 
shafts in 2016 had to be reviewed by DMR and made lighter after the mine had drawn an 
affidavit to court warning that such a Section 54 would result in closure of the mine with a 
potential job losses of 9500 workers (McKay, 2016). 
 
Cameron (2017) reported on comments made by Gideon du Plessis, General Secretary of 
Solidarity, that in certain instances sudden work stoppages due to Section 54 pose a safety 
risk in that seismic events can increase due to increasing pressures on the face that is caused 
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due to a pressure build up when the face is stopped over a period of time.  Also, the same 
pressure can lead to major falls of rock at the re-start of work after Section 54 instruction has 
been lifted. Further risks can occur as more pressure is placed on workers to recoup the lost 
production. Gideon du Plessis, as quoted by Cameron (2017) continued to say that Lonmin’s 
CEO pointed out that Section 54 instructions do affect not only production but also disturbs 
routine safety protocols which endanger workers when work is re-started. 
 
In the African Rainbow Minerals Sustainability Report (2017) it is reported that during the 2016 
financial year African Rainbow Minerals lost R503 million and in 2017 financial year African 
Rainbow Minerals lost R335 million due to Section 54 stoppages, one of the company’s focus 
points for 2018 was to reduce Section 54 work interruptions. 
 
The Mine Health and Safety Act No.72 of 1997 read in-conjunction with Act No.74 of 2008, 
reveals that when Section 54 of the MHSA was amended in 2008, sub-sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 
were deleted. These sub-sections were there to allow the management and workers 
representatives to make representations before the Inspector of Mines could give the Section 
54 instruction. Now Section 54 stoppages can be issued without any legal obligation for the 
IOM to listen to any representations. One can assume these sub-sections were deleted to 
speed up the issuance of Section 54 instructions to prevent immediate danger to the health 
and safety of workers or any other persons. However, Beech (n.d.)  argue that the deleted 
subsections were there to help an Inspector of Mines to follow administrative fairness in the 
application of the law. 
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 DMR	records	on	Section	54	issued	over	a	five-year	period	
The two biggest DMR Inspectorate regional offices, based on the number of mines, were 
chosen for personal interviews.  The Mpumalanga regional office, which is also in the region 
of the dissertation and Gauteng regional office were used to discuss Section 54 issued over a 
five-year period (2011 to 2015). Since 2015 the DMR is not releasing Section 54 statistics.  
The reasons for this lack of transparency is unknown but may be a means to manage the public 
perception around Section 54s. For example, there was a perception that the DMR was issuing 
Section 54s to benefiting the politically-connected Gupta family-linked companies (McKay, 
2016). Figure 8 indicates that Section 54 issuance from the Mpumalanga regional office from 
2011 to 2015 increased by 91%, a clear indication that during this period the use of Section 54 
as a tool to ensure MHSA compliance increased in the coal mines. Noting that this regional 
office predominantly monitors coal mines. 
 
Figure 8: Section 54s Issued in Mpumalanga DMR region 2011 – 2015 
 
The Gauteng regional office is not in the region of the study but was chosen to validate that 
Section 54 issuance as a MHSA compliance tool has increased throughout the South African 
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mining industry. It suggests that the increase in Section 54 stoppages is a DMR Inspectorate 
policy. Figure 9 depicts the issuance of Section 54s in the Gauteng region from 2012 to 2016, 
noting that no records were available for 2012.  From 2013 to 2016 the issuance of Section 54 
to the mines in the Gauteng region increased by 3233%, a significant increase that shows an 
uncompromising application of Section 54.  The increase is significant not only for the region 
but also for the South African mining industry as a whole. 
 
 
Figure 9: Section 54s issued in Gauteng DMR Region 2012 to 2016 
 
2.6.1 The	Gloy	dissertation	on	Section	54	mine	stoppages	
Gloy (2014) produced a Master's dissertation entitled “The use of Section 54 stoppage orders 
in terms of the Mine Health and Safety Act”. The dissertation reviews Section 54 notices in 
conjunction with similar notices in the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) and the 
National Environmental Management Act (NEMA). The Gloy dissertation was triggered by 
frustrations in the mining industry and mining employers regarding what they consider unfair 
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issuances of Section 54 notices by the IOM in the DMR. The findings of the Gloy’s dissertation 
do not discuss how Section 54s are scripted but rather on the inconsistency of its enforcement. 
In other words how the IOM exercise Section 54 notices at their discretion. Section 54 of the 
MHSA contains the phrase “reason to believe” which provides an IOM broad discretion. For 
example, if the IOM has reason to believe that a section or shaft is unsafe the IOM at his own 
discretion may implement a Section 54 notice, while another IOM may impose a Section 55 
notice. Hence the need for a clear guideline that would bring consistency in the enforcement 
of the same section. 
 
In the administration of the OHSA, as reported by Gloy (2014), the Department of Labour 
(2011) p.2 has an Enforcement Manual published in 2011 to systemise the issuing of stoppage 
notices. The 2011 p.2 Enforcement Manual contains this sentence “Inspectors must not serve 
prohibition notices lightly and without restriction, as prohibition notices can have serious 
financial implications for the employer or user”.  Gloy (2014) points out that the Enforcement 
Manual has an interest in the health and safety of employees as well as avoidance to cause 
harm to the industry. In the NEMA the Department of Environmental Affairs balances 
compliance with economic growth, an example is the incorporation of compliance notices 
before a stoppage notice.  This means the employer is given a warning or a chance to rectify 
the non-compliance issue before a stoppage notice is issued. 
 
Gloy (2014) concludes the following: 
• Section 54 stoppages have consequences that affect the environment as fewer 
finances decrease the ability of the mine to support or finance community projects 
that support sustainable environmental management such as disposal of domestic 
waste. 
• Section 54 stoppages affect the economy and development in local communities. 
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• Section 54 stoppages impact Section 100(2) (a) of the MPRDA, hence reduces the 
broad-based socioeconomic empowerment of Historical Disadvantaged South 
Africans (HDSA). 
• Enforcement guideline in Mine Health and Safety Inspectorate requires 
improvement, as it does not incorporate a clause of observing economic 
sustainability when Section 54s are being enforced.  Such a change in the 
guidelines would put Section 54 instructions in line within the OHSA and NEMA. 
 
2.6.2 Misuse	of	Section	54s	notices	
Mining ENSight (2013) noted a practice whereby IOMs while using Section 54 powers were 
withdrawing statutory appointments on the mines and advising the mine employers to re-train 
such individuals as a condition for such Section 54 to be lifted. A mine employee whose 
competence certificate is withdrawn temporarily or permanently cannot perform duties 
acquired by the possession of a competency certificate which means that an IOM would have 
the ability to use a Section 54 notice to invariably influence an employer and employee 
relationship that is enshrined in the Labour Relations Act (LRA). The question in such 
circumstances is whether the IOM has acted in a justified, fitting and fair manner according to 
the LRA. Mining ENSight (2013) describes an IOM as a“creatures of statute”, meaning an IOM 
should only act within the confines of what the law empowers them to do. The use of Section 
54 notices to influence LRA should be considered unlawful. 
 
The article entitled “Is DMR deliberately sabotaging mining industry” by Jeffery (2017) reveals 
the following:- 
• An IOM official was suspended from work after blackmailing a colliery with the use 
of Section 54 for personal financial gain.  
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• Industry unfriendly legislation has led to thousands of jobs being lost in the mining 
industry in the last seven years. 
• Within four years preceding 2015 about 60% of mining companies experienced a 
rapid increase of Section 54s which saw R13.6 billion in revenue being lost during 
the same period. 
• Protracted Section 54 stoppages turned profit-making mines into loss-making 
mines. 
• Some senior mining executives view prolonged Section 54s stoppages as 
retribution. 
 
Conflict is evident between the good intention of the enactment of Section 54 and its 
implementation. There is a need for training for both Inspectors of Mines and mine employees, 
to improve on the implementation of Section 54. 
 
 International	Review	of	relevant	literature	
2.7.1 Introduction		
An international literature review has been undertaken to examine the similarities and 
differences between foreign mine Inspectorates and the South African DMR Inspectorate. The 
objective of the literature review of North American, European and Australasian experiences 
is to benchmark how mine officials apply their similar administrative actions of Section 54s in 
their respective countries.  Some of the specific instruments used in international administrative 
actions are policies, enforcement guidelines and issues of measuring standards as applied in 
ensuring health and safety compliance on mines.  Further, the review investigates the 
administration and legislative provisions made by the various countries in terms of work 
stoppages.  
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When legislation is designed or enacted there is always an objective to be fulfilled. With Section 
54s one can assume it was formulated to reduce or eliminate sub-standard health and safety 
acts during mining operations. While investigating international legislation similar to Section 
54, one is aware that the design of legislation is not scientifically based but rather socio-
economic-political based. Also, what is essential in the implementation of particular legislation 
is other factors such as competence of the implementers, training and trust-relationship issues. 
 
2.7.2 North	America	
In the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1990, Ontario, Canada; it is interesting to note 
that the same Act is silent on the powers and duties of the Inspector. What is noticeable in the 
Act is that when an employer makes a decision that is deemed risky, the employer must inform 
the Inspector, the health and safety representative or committee on the mine. The above Act 
is similar to the MHSA in South Africa which also requires the employer to inform workers and 
seek permission from the DMR if the mine is contemplating an undertaking of non-routine 
activities on the mine. In the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1990, Ontario, Canada; 
while the employer is required to inform the Inspector in the same Act, the employer is not 
seeking permission from the Inspector. One can only assume that at the inception of this Act 
in Ontario the employer is trusted to uphold the health and safety of mining personnel. 
 
In Canada, the Ontario Occupational Health and Safety Act of 2017 Section 57 empowers an 
Inspector to stop dangerous work operations. No literature has been found pointing to any 
grievances or negative perceptions of this enforcement by the employers or the public.  
The “U.S. Department of Labour-Mine Safety and Health Administration-Coal Mine Safety and 
Health (2007)” prescribes for Inspectors “refresher training” for four hours in a year and 
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“specialised training for three days in a year. The fact that this training is prescribed in statute 
and makes it compulsory for Inspectors to be trained on an annual basis enables Inspectors 
to keep up to date with current issues and challenges of the mining industry. There is a learning 
point in the training of Inspectors from the USA noting that the MHSA of South Africa does not 
make provision for on-going training for IOMs. Hence, the MHSC should consider introducing 
similar sections in the MHSA for continuous improvement in health and safety enforcement. 
 
In the USA, all Mine Safety and Health Agency (MSHA) employees must comply with the 
Operator requests for Assistance and Enforcement Fairness Policy (2014). The policy is 
designed to assure mining employers that they will not face victimisation from the MSHA if they 
criticise the MSHA on how they conduct themselves during the enforcement of the USA Mine 
Safety and Health Act.  
 
The above policy also links to the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996, which requires that federal government employees to be lenient with small operators 
during the enforcement of the Mine Safety and Health Act. Leniency is achieved by practising 
unbiased and well-grounded decisions regarding health and safety as well as sharing 
information, training opportunities and access to new technologies. This policy allows 
Inspectors to be fair when exercising their duties and to be cognisant that their decisions impact 
sustainability, which could negatively affect the viability of mining operations. 
 
2.7.3 Europe	
In England, Wales and Germany, discretion on enforcement is used hence the need for 
comprehensive enforcement policies. In South Africa the IOM also exercises his/her discretion 
to use Section 54 hence an enforcement policy or guideline for that is essential. 
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England and Wales have the “Enforcement Management Model” which emphasises the 
adherence to the “principle of proportionality” in enforcement, which means that the actions of 
a regulator should be in line with the perceived risk (Tilindyte, 2012). In Germany, it is also 
clear that sanctions using legislation are used as a last resort; accordingly, there is more focus 
on “cooperative”, and “informal” approaches to enforcement and the Inspectors tend to call 
themselves “service providers” (Tilindyte, 2012). So there are certainly more “improvement 
notices” issued as compared to “prohibition notices”. In England and Wales, naming and 
shaming of offenders are also used (Tilindyte, 2012). 
 
Tilindyte (2012) in an article “An economic comparative approach” of Germany, England and 
Wales’ policies in enforcing health and safety regulations, points out that in Europe the focus 
seems to be more of giving guidance to employers with harsh penalties on severe 
transgressions. Tilindyte's (2012) study examines the enforcement of health and safety with 
the legal and economic components in mind. Tilindyte (2012) proposes to the regulator that 
the benefits costs should be higher than the costs of enforcement. There is no literature 
evidence on how South African mine stoppages are selected. Is it risk assessment based or 
just chance? Is it from a health and safety rating system or number of workforce or intelligence 
gathering information on an existing system? A guideline would help to know that Section 54 
stoppages have an end game plan in mind which is useful in sustainable enforcement. 
 
Swedish Work Environment authority has monetary or work stoppages sanctions when 
enforcing health and safety at mine workplaces.  In Sweden also accidents and incidents are 
significantly reduced by an efficient system that uses “near misses” as “leading indicators” to 
put up strategies to prevent harm to mineworkers (Elgstrand & Vingard, 2013). In all this 
international literature the research has not yet found any public outrage to mine stoppages 
similar to the South African Section 54, which could mean that there are other factors not yet 
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identified in the implementation of Section 54 which are at play in the South African mining 
industry. 
 
In Germany, the Mining Policy and Regulations can be summed up by taking into consideration 
the Federal Mining Act of 1980 and many Mining Ordinances, in all these provisions health 
and safety standards of workers are covered. In the implementation of the Mining Policy and 
Regulations, the sustainability of the German mining industry is always the goal. In this 
instance, the pillars of sustainable development are made up of protection of the environment, 
social and economic progression. This means health and safety is not viewed in isolation of 
other elements of sustainable living.  
 
2.7.4 Australia	
John Braithwaite and Peter Grabosky (1985) conducted a study on the Occupational Health 
and Safety Enforcement in Australia. Braithwaite and Grabosky discuss three enforcement 
observations, of which two of the strategies are done by the government Inspectors and the 
other strategy is conducted by the workers union. The first Inspectors’ strategy, in this case, is 
what they call the “harassment” strategy which entails frequent visits and a lot of mail 
correspondence to offending mines without stopping operations. In this strategy, the Inspectors 
became a nuisance until the mine “toes the line” (Braithwaite and Grabosky, 1985). One 
obvious pitfall about a strategy like this is that it will cost the Inspectorate time and money and 
it would not be something to consider in South Africa as an alternative to Section 54 
instructions. The second strategy the Inspectors use is mine stoppage, Braithwaite and 
Grabosky point out that mine stoppage strategy is rarely used and if used the focus should be 
“preventative” and never “punitive”. The third strategy is when union workers stop operations 
until the government Inspectors come. The Braithwaite and Grabosky study did not investigate 
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the cost-benefit analysis of the three strategies, and their study concluded that regulator’s 
policies drive enforcement and not by the nature of legislation nor the powers of the 
Inspectorate nor the court systems nor the number of Inspectors in the field. Braithwaite and 
Grabosky further add the Australian Inspectorate in different states favours the strategy of 
“cooperative” over “deterrence” in law enforcement on the mines. 
 
Braithwaite and Grabosky point out that full reliance on persuasion does not work and full 
reliance on punishment does not work as too much punishment produces customs of 
opposition, which are manifested in legal actions. Braithwaite and Grabosky also points out 
that wrong intentioned people are hard to persuade, and well intentioned people stop 
complying when they are over punished and continue to claim that the high accident rates in 
USA coal mines can be ascribed to “punishment policies” that destroyed “trust” and “respect” 
between the Inspectorate and colliery operators. In Braithwaite and Grabosky (1985) the 
authors observed that experienced inspectors are important in diagnostic fault finding as they 
look for failures in “control systems” after looking for failures in “management systems.”  
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2.8 Chapter	Summary	
2.8.1 Lessons from South African Literature 
The mining industry, when it comes to the IOM administration of the MHSA is against total 
shaft or mine closure and would rather see partial mine closure when a Section 54 notice 
issued at a mine. Partial mine closure is when only the “health and safety” sub-standard part 
of the works or act at a mine is affected by the Section 54 notice, thus leaving the “health and 
safety” standard compliant sections of the mine operational. Most preferable the mining 
industry would rather have the IOM applying Section 55 notices,  which does not require 
operations or acts at a mine to stop, but rather seek improvements of sub-standards within a 
specified period. 
 
Literature reveals a reduction of accidents in the mining industry as the frequency in application 
of Section 54s increased, indicating that revenue losses due to Section 54s may be partly 
managed by improved standards that in turn reduce Section 54 mine stoppages. 
 
A further surge of Section 54 mine stoppages brought with it issues of reported corruption and 
mines taking the Inspectorate to court on allegation of unfair mine stoppages. The literature 
also identifies an advent of court litigations by the mining industry brought a tangible reduction 
of Section 54 mine stoppages enforced by the IOMs. 
 
2.8.2 Lessons from International Literature 
The following section discusses areas in which South Africa can potentially learn from based 
on the international literature review.  For example, Sections 11 of the MHSA requires the 
employer to identify, assess and respond to health and safety hazards at the workplace.  Some 
learning that could be useful to improve on Section 11 are discussed next, noting that Section 
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11 is similar to the statutory instruments of other countries.  For example, the Ontario mine 
safety legislation recognises that a culture co-operation in terms of health and safety with 
stakeholders significantly improves the implementation of health and safety at mine operations. 
 
Another area to be considered is how mine stoppages are enforced.  Mine stoppages are 
covered in other countries statutes, for example, Sweden mining industry, and in Canada, the 
Ontario Occupational Health and Safety Act of 2017 Section 57 empowers an IOM to stop 
dangerous work operations.  But in other countries, workers are empowered to order mine 
stoppages in the interest of health and safety, for example, in Australia. There is no similar 
provision in the South African MHSA. 
 
Lesson can be learned from international best practice in terms of notices to fix rather than 
mine stoppages.  In Germany, England, and Wales research indicates that more “improvement 
notices” are issued as compared to “prohibition notices”, which translates to the South African 
mining industry as fewer Section 54 notices and more Section 55 notices are issued. 
 
In the USA, all MSHA employees must comply with the Operator Requests for Assistance and 
Enforcement Fairness Policy (2014). The Policy is designed to assure mining employers that 
they would not face victimisation from MSHA employees when they criticise the MSHA 
employees on how they conduct themselves during the enforcement of Mine Safety and Health 
Act. This is an important point because most respondents to the questionnaires stated that 
DMR Inspectors act unfairly during Section 54 stoppages; noting that there is no policy from 
the DMR to guard against allegations of victimisation. 
 
Training and coaching is promoted overseas and could be applicable to South Africa.  In 
Europe, the focus is on giving guidance to employers.  Enforcement of health and safety in 
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Europe tends to attempt to avoid legal and economic consequences to the mining industry; 
however harsh penalties may be implemented for employers who severely transgress the 
mining laws. 
 
There is something to learn from USA literature in that complaints by the industry on being 
victims of legislation, or enforcement methods are not always accurate hence the importance 
of independent studies that will discern the truth. Industry is well known for exaggerated claims 
about the costs regulation will pose. The best-documented instance in the occupational health 
and safety literature is tougher vinyl chloride standards in the USA which industry projected 
would have compliance costs of $65 billion and cause a loss of 1.6 million jobs (Mendeloff, 
1979). In the event industry figures indicated that no job loss were incurred and compliance 
costs of around $300 million (Gunningham, 1984). 
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3 CHAPTER	3:	RESEARCH	METHODOLOGY	
 Chapter	Overview	
The process followed to justify the outcome of this research is outlined in this chapter. In 
addition, this chapter focuses on the research design with particular attention to the 
methodology followed. The research further discusses the research population, sampling size, 
sampling methodology, research instruments, data collection and data analysis, significance 
of research, and ethical considerations. 
 
The name of collieries where the respondents worked are mentioned in Chapter 1.  Most of 
the questionnaires were received from S Colliery 31%, D 14% and R 13%, which represents 
58% of the total respondents.  There were 266 completed questionnaires. Figure 10 depicts 
the category of work for the respondents of the questionnaire in percentage.   
 
Figure 10: Work category of questionnaire respondents 
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The following definitions are used to define the work categories used in this dissertation: 
• Supervisor – applies to miners, mechanics, fitters, electricians, technicians 
• Skilled labour – applies to, data capturers, learner miners or learner technicians. 
• Unskilled – general labours, conveyor belt attendants, or assistants to skilled labour. 
• Operators – Applies to continuous miner operators, shuttle car operators and roof 
bolting operators. 
• Middle management – applies to shift supervisors or shift bosses, and foremans to 
mine overseers. 
• Senior Management – applies to section managers, section engineers, to mine 
manager levels of a working mine. 
 
 Research	Population	
A single question instrument was designed and discussed with the supervisor. Individual 
industry interviews were conducted with mine management, DMR, Nation Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) and the questionnaire was provided to 266 participants to answer. Fifty-
eight percent (58%) of the questionnaires were handed in person and 42% were sent 
electronically and there was no observable variance in responses. After that, the questionnaire 
was ready for the research survey. 
 
 Research	sample	and	location	
This research is undertaken in the South African Coalfields. A combination of qualitative and 
quantitative research was undertaken.  A literature review regarding Section 54s was 
undertaken to highlight some of the impacts that Section 54s have on the South African mining 
industry as a whole.   
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In addition to the literature review, a number of case studies were conducted with the collieries 
mentioned in Chapter 1.  
 
Additional data was gathered from the DMR Gauteng and Mpumalanga offices to enable 
quantitative information to be collected. Further interviews with key stakeholders enabled 
qualitative data to be sourced and analysed. 
 
 Validity	and	Reliability	
The questionnaire was sent to eleven individuals as a pre-test to determine the validity and 
reliability of the questions. Their results are also computed with the rest of the respondents. 
Because of a low number, their significance in terms of negatively influencing the results of 
this survey is negligible. 
 
 Data	Analysis	
The results obtained for the variables tested were averaged to obtain a rating on each of the 
dimensions tested.   
 
 Ethical	Consideration	
Ethics considerations were made during design and application of the questionnaire. 
Recipients were told not to answer questions they didn’t understand, or felt were 
unprofessional in their own interpretation of the question. Also the questionnaire did not require 
the participant’s identities. Further acceptability of the questionnaire was tested when 
responses were sought from National Union of Mineworkers in North West, DMR Inspectorate 
in Gauteng and Mpumalanga. 
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 Methodology	
3.7.1 Data	capture	and	dependability	
As previously discussed in Section 3.2, a single question instrument was designed and 
discussed with the supervisor. Industry interviews were conducted with mine management, 
DMR, National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the questionnaire was provided to 266 
participants to answer. 58% of the questionnaires were handed in person and 42% were sent 
electronically, and there was no observable variance in responses. After that the questionnaire 
was ready for the research survey.  
 
The questionnaire was broken down into seven categories and the purpose of each category 
is explained below each category title:- 
3.7.1.1 Biographical	Information	
Where possible identify occupational categories that answered the questionnaire and analyse 
any variance between the occupational groups. Senior management is strategically focused, 
hence the focus on policies, budgets, resources, goals, the micro and macro business 
environments. Middle management is more tactical hence the use of dynamic approaches as 
the situation on the ground changes in achieving goals. The general workforce tends to be 
operational in their approach of things as they are part of processes and their goal is to control 
their unit process. 
3.7.1.2 Collaboration	amongst	DMR,	Employer	and	Labour	
Examine trust, communication and cooperation issues amongst the key stakeholders who 
oversee the fair administration of the MHSA, as this could point out issues of partial 
enforcement. By statute, the policy framework of the MHSA is done by a tripartite body known 
as the Mine Health and Safety Council (MHSC). The MHSC comprises of equal 
representatives from the DMR, Mining Employers and Organised Labour. 
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3.7.1.3 Knowledge	of	Section	54	
Knowledge of Section 54 is critical to manage its impacts of mine stoppages. Knowledge of 
Section 54 correlates to training and communication in the administration of Section 54. Lack 
of knowledge on Section 54 would make submitted answers less valid. 
3.7.1.4 Capacity	to	implement	mine	standards		
Section 54s are mainly issued because the mine fails to meet their own standards that have 
been developed by the mine itself.  The availability of capacity becomes a critical factor in 
implementing and maintaining the stipulated mine standards. Also the competence of mine 
personnel involved in implementation of the standards should be reviewed as well as to 
examine the professionalism of personnel involved in implementation of mine standards.  
3.7.1.5 Enforcement	of	Section	54		
One would like to know if systems are in place like policies, guidelines and training for 
personnel involved in the implementation of mine standards. Equally important is to know if 
Section 54 is proportionally used in relation to other tools in the Inspectorate toolbox. 
3.7.1.6 Implementation	problems	of	Section	54	
Distinguish implementation problems from impacts and which of the stakeholders are 
experiencing the problems. 
3.7.1.7 Impacts	of	Section	54	
The questionnaire was mainly made up of open-ended questions to bring clarity on the nature 
of research objectives, remain relevant to targeted stakeholders, and to help refine research 
questions. 
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3.7.2 Analysis	of	data	
The University of Johannesburg STATKOM was engaged in the analysis of data and Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) statistical software ran the captured data. 
3.7.3 Results	and	discussion	
The research assesses the impacts of Section 54 in coal mines. Producing coal mines are 
mainly in the Mpumalanga province hence 75.5% of respondents mentioned the province as 
Mpumalanga, Free State 10.2%, Gauteng 4.1%, KwaZulu Natal 0.4%, Limpopo 5.6% and 
North West 2.3%. 
 Chapter	Summary	
This chapter has explained the methodology that was used and a set of reasons why this 
methodology was adopted. A breakdown of the sample population and work categories of 
participants is also given. The validity, reliability and ethics issued are also covered. 
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4 CHAPTER	4:	RESEARCH	OUTCOMES		
 Chapter	Overview	
This chapter provides detail regarding the results; from the literature review, interviews with 
mine personnel, DMR personnel, and results from the questionnaires. The full list of 
questionnaire can be found in Chapter 8. 
 
 Interviews	and	Results	from	the	Questionnaire	
4.2.1 Results from Platinum Mine  
The research is focused on the impacts of Section 54 on coal mines. A Section 54 notice can 
stop all or part of production at a mine, irrespective what commodity is being mined. A survey 
was conducted at two of Impala shafts, where platinum is being mined.  The survey was used 
to gain an understanding if there is any resemblance on the resultant unintended 
consequences brought about by Section 54 mine stoppages on hard rock mines compared to 
the soft rock coal mines.  The research at the Impala shafts highlighted the loss of morale by 
workers due to the Section 54 notices. The resemblance in the data, whether qualitative or 
quantitative, validates the accuracy of similar results gathered from coal mines, which was 
found to be the case.  
 
Interviews were conducted at Impala No. 1 and No. 10 shafts. The interview of mineworkers 
attempted to ascertain the feelings that employees had when a Section 54 notice was enforced 
after a fatal accident occurred at the mine’s No. 1 shaft. The No.1 shaft employees were sent 
to the mobilisation centre for rehabilitation briefing. At the same time Shaft No. 10 staff were 
participating in a regular training session at the mobilisation centre and therefore included in 
the interviews.  
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The data includes both morning and night shift team members with a small proportion of the 
sample representing panel leaders and miners. The mine is located in the North-West 
Province, where the majority of people speak Tswana and are South African citizens. Close to 
half of the employees interviewed did not complete matric (43%), and 20% (the older 
employees) are illiterate.  
 
The following attitudes were identified through the interview process with the Impala Platinum 
employees:- 
• 50% mentioned the requirement of doing extra work without bonus payment. 
• Employees are aware that supervisors are troubled by Section 54.  
• 80% of the employees believe Section 54s are fairly applied. 
• 86% view re-training as a result of Section 54 instructions to bring about behaviour 
change in the workplace.  
• 13% of employees were ascribed to those workers who did not see the benefits of 
re-training after a Section 54 stoppage because they perceived Section 54 as being 
applied unfairly.   
• There was an awareness by 98% of employees that Section 54 instructions by IOM 
require normal work to stop until sub-standards (non-compliance issues) identified 
by the IOM have been rectified.  
• 98% employees expressed willingness to quickly fix non-compliance issues that 
brought about Section 54 stoppage so that working for their bonuses can 
recommence. 
• 72% employees thought a good communication protocol would be to allow workers 
to talk directly to IOM rather than communicate through their own supervisors.  
• Employees would like IOM to visit their work places more frequently.  
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• Employees were against the closing of the whole shaft in instances were only one 
panel of the shaft was found to be non-compliant.  
• Employees want the process of lifting of Section 54 stoppages to be speeded up.  
• Employees would like assistance from IOM in the form of how to comply with the 
MHSA. 
 
The findings from the Impala Platinum questionnaire indicate that the workers are affected by 
stoppages i.e. loss of bonus, but also acknowledge the benefits of the Section 54 stoppages.  
The workers also provided realistic concerns regarding communication, the application of 
Section 54s and the time required to lift Section 54 notices.  Importantly, the questionnaire 
highlighted that employees are aware of the Section 54 process.  
 
4.2.2 Financial Implications from Section 54 Stoppages  
Two mines provided financial information regarding the financial impacts of Section 54 
stoppages.  This information provided realistic costs that concurred with some of the claims 
made by the literature review i.e. there is a cost that can be associated with the Section 54 
stoppages. 
 
4.2.2.1 Section	54	Stoppages	Impacts	at	S	Colliery	
A visit was made to S Colliery in Standerton, Mpumalanga province to gather qualitative and 
quantitative data of the impacts of Section 54 stoppages. Discussions were held with the Chief 
Safety Officer and an assurance was made to the Chief Safety Officer, that any data gathered 
from the colliery will only be used in the write up of the dissertation and will not be for public 
consumption. As Table 5 indicates, 11 Section 54 stoppages were issued to the colliery over 
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a five year period with the resultant revenue lost per Section 54 instruction ranging from the 
lowest amount of just over R0.5 million to the highest amount of over R11.5 million. 
 
Table 5: S Colliery Section 54 Stoppages 
S Colliery Section 54 Stoppages 
Date 
Dangerous 
Occurrence 
Days of 
stoppages 
Tonnes 
lost per 
day 
Delivered 
unit 
cost/tonne 
Production 
losses(R) 
04/03/2013 Fatal accident 7 11091 1029.43 11 417 408 
14/10/2013 Fatal accident 8 15538 535.88 8 326 503 
14/01/2014 
Substandard tractor 
road 6 800 848.48 678 784 
16/10/2014 
Substandard lamp 
room 5 6517 365.56 2 382 354 
27/05/2015 Fall of ground incident 6 7400 1102.36 815 7464 
30/06/2015 Winder substandard 36 unknown 908.76  N/A 
03/11/2015 
Excessive 
accumulation of H2O  5 3400 1130.28 384 2952 
28/09/2016 Substandard support 2 2400 716.1 1 718 640 
25/10/2016 Audit findings 1 9472 857.68 8 123 944 
11/01/2017 Winder substandard 3 4700 548.47 2 577 809 
25/02/2017 Fall of ground incident 2.5 1076 537.72 578 586 
 
The 11 Section 54s were issued because of serious transgressions; two Section 54s were 
based on fatal accidents, while the other nine were due to sub-standard acts, like poor roof 
conditions, and flooding as indicated in Table 5.   
 
Could some of these transgressions have been addressed differently by the IOM?  This 
question will be addressed in the following chapter (Chapter 5) of this dissertation.   
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4.2.2.2 Section	54	Stoppages	Impacts	at	T	Colliery		
The data from T Colliery situated in northern Kwa Zulu Natal was attained through a manager 
from the colliery who was at the time attending a government competence course at the 
University of Johannesburg. Assurances were made to the manager that the information would 
only be used for the purposes of this dissertation. Table 6 records six Section 54 stoppages 
that were issued over eight years with the resultant loss of R37 million in revenue. 
 
Impacts of the Section 54 stoppages that were recorded at T Colliery due to the Section 54 
instructions are highlighted below:- 
• Failure to meet monthly production targets.  
• Concern among the employees regarding payment of production bonuses and in 
many instances the loss of bonuses for employees. 
• Production teams operating below complement due to female employees stopped 
from going underground.   
• Increased operating costs due to lower tonnage outputs. 
• Employees walking in and out of a 1000m long 7-degree decline shaft.  
• Employees walking long distances to the face because of the stoppage of all 
personnel carriers.  
• Increased absenteeism due to employee’s low morale. 
 
The learnings from Colliery T highlight the consequences of the Section 54 stoppages to the 
workforce.  The workforce indicates the stoppage of personnel carriage and the non availability 
of the female workforce negatively affected production and the workers bonus and moral, as 
workers were required to walk long distance by foot and teams were required to operate under 
staffed. 
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Table 6: T Colliery Section 54 Stoppages 
 
DATE 
 
DANGEROUS OCCURRENCE 
DAYS OF 
STOPPAGE 
TONNES 
LOST PER 
DAY 
 
COST 
27-Oct-09 Methane ignition by battery rotary hammer drill 
 
13 900 R 11,700,000 
26-Jan-12 Failure to adhere to Code of Practice and 
standards 
 
2 400 R 2,000,000 
21-Sep-12 1. No Ventilation indicators on tractor road.                                                                
2.  Escape route in a very bad state and cannot                          
be used as emergency escape route.                                                             
3.  Inadequate ventilation of headings, fireman's 
report not completed for dykes and slips not 
indicated on plan. 
 
10 1200 R 12,000,000 
22-Oct-14 1. Working under unsupported area                         
2. Not fencing off unsupported areas                            
3.  Failure to adhere to breaker line support rule 
 
2 3800 R 3,800,000 
23-Jun-15 No female toilets in the underground workings 
 
2 0 R3,000 
29-May-16 1.  LDV Rolled over in the incline shaft                      
2.  Conveyor belt structure damaged in the incline  
3.  One employee injured  
 
5 1500 R 7,500,000 
 
 
 
58 
4.2.3 Interviews 
Individual interviews were conducted with National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) 
representative at their headquarters in Johannesburg, a DMR Senior Inspector at the Gauteng 
Regional office and a mine manager at M Coal. They were all assured of the confidentiality of 
the interview. 
 
4.2.3.1 M	Coal	Mine	
At the interview, the mine manager for M coal mine outlined impacts that have been ascribed 
to instances when Section 54 stoppages were “unfairly” applied on the colliery:- 
• Loss of production tonnage. 
• Loss of business/revenue due to the inability of the mine to supply to customers.  
For example, inability to supply coal to Eskom. 
• Excess overhead expenses, as a result of extra costs being required to conduct 
repairs to perceived “defects”.  
• Workers motivation to produce decreased, as a result in stoppages due to loss of 
bonus.  
The same mine manager also provided positive impacts from Section 54 stoppages, such as:- 
• Improved training to workers as a means to prevent further Section 54 stoppages. 
• Improved supervision of workers through the update of procedures, standards, and 
retraining of supervisors. 
• Implementation of additional risk management systems. 
• Improved monitoring programmes on the health and safety of workers. 
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The above positive impacts resulted in the mine improving its compliance with the MHSA.  In 
addition, the mine recorded a decline in mine related injuries and fatalities. 
4.2.3.2 National	Union	of	Mineworkers	and	DMR	
The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) representative views on Section 54 stoppages was 
that the stoppages had a positive impact on health and safety of their members. The 
representative also mentioned that NUM engages with mine management so that their 
members are not affected by Section 54 stoppages, except for bonus, and that if there is any 
blame for Section 54 stoppages that blame should go to the employers.  The NUM 
representative contends that Section 54s have nothing to do with the workforce, but is a 
management issue. 
4.2.3.3 Department	of	Mineral	Resources	
The DMR Senior Inspector during the interview had both positives and negatives comments 
for Section 54 stoppages.  The positive impacts reported as:- 
• Promotes training of employees. 
• Provides a safe working environment. 
• Promotes compliance with the MHSA. 
• Mine management is compelled to appoint workers who are qualified and skilled. 
• Contributes to the reduction of mine accidents. 
The negative impacts highlighted are:- 
• In most cases, negative impacts affect mine employees and not DMR employees in 
losses of bonuses. 
• Loss of production and profit by the mines. 
• Somehow the country’s economy is affected due to losses incurred by Section 54 
stoppages at the mines. 
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• Mineworkers are frustrated to break their routine in order to fix noncompliant 
conditions. 
• An emerging trend of lawsuits to the Mines Inspectorate. 
 
In the interviews some views of mine management, NUM, and the Inspectorate (DMR) were 
similar; such as that Section 54s bring about improved safety standards and workforce training 
as a positive impact.  Both mine management and the Inspectorate also identified the negative 
impacts of Section 54 notices as being a loss of revenue for both the mine and the employees 
(bonus).   
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4.2.4 Results from the Questionnaire 
4.2.4.1 General	Understanding	of	Section	54s	
Table 7 lists a number of questions provided to the interviewees (key stakeholders) around 
collaboration amongst employers, employees, and the DMR.  Table 7 also highlights the 
response provided and the percentage of the positive responses.  
Table 7:  Question and Response regarding collaboration amongst DMR, Employers and 
Labour  
Question Response 
Do you acknowledge DMR’s contribution to 
promoting Health & Safety with the enforcement 
of Section 54 of the MHSA? 
97% of respondents out of a total of 266 said 
Yes. This means the role of DMR to promote 
health and safety is acknowledged. 
Do you acknowledge the employer’s 
contribution to implement all the requirements of 
Section 54 notices?  
96.6% of respondents said Yes. Again, the 
role of the employer to implement health and 
safety is acknowledged. 
Do you acknowledge labour’s contribution to 
accepting the implementing of Section 54 
notices? 
 
95.5% of respondents said Yes, also there is 
a strong awareness that workers have a role 
to play in the implementation of health and 
safety. 
Do you believe that employers are willing to 
avoid the issuance of Section 54 notices? 
91% of respondents said Yes, it shows that 
employers make a lot of effort to avoid Section 
54 stoppages. For 9% who replied No they 
replied it is because the employer does not 
comply with the legislation and mine 
standards. 
Do you believe that Section 54 is applied fairly 
by the Inspectorate?  
77.1% of respondents answered Yes. For the 
22.9% who said No, their reasons were that 
IOM were not consistent, wanted bribes, 
enjoyed abusing power, and also don’t listen 
to management opinions. 
Do you believe that Labour is capable to 
implement Section 54? 
76% of respondents said Yes. For those that 
said No, their reasons were that it is not the 
workers responsibility, workers don’t have the 
capacity, and also that workers primary focus 
is production. 
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The following questions provided in Table 8 were asked to gain an understanding of the 
respondents understanding and knowledge of Section 54s.   
Table 8: Questions and Responses regarding knowledge of Section 54  
Question Response 
Do you have an understanding of Section 54 
stoppages? 
90% of respondents said Yes and their reason 
was that it is there to stop unsafe operations 
and acts on the mine. 
Do you think your employer fully understands the 
implications of Section 54 stoppages? 
96% of respondents said Yes. 
Does a policy exist for workers on what to do, in 
order to reduce the issuance of Section 54s? 
87% of respondents said Yes. 
Do you think Inspectors of Mines fully understand 
the implications of Section 54? 
91% of respondents said Yes. 
Does your employer use safety performance 
incentives to reduce the issuance of Section 54s? 
As indicated in the results below, 76% said 
yes, and the remainder said either replied No 
or did not answer the question. 
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In order to better understand how Section 54 notices are influenced by poor adherence to the 
MHSA and to mine standards two questions were included in the questionnaire focusing on 
the capacity of the mine to implement mine standards (Table 9).  
 
Table 9: Questions and Responses regarding capacity to implement mine standards 
Question Response 
In order to enforce MHSA, you need high 
technical knowledge & experience. Do you think 
DMR has got that? 
About 82% of the respondents said Yes which 
somehow shows confidence with the DMR. 
For those that answered no their reasons were 
that DMR staff lack experience, have low 
salaries, are inconsistent and are unrealistic. 
Which gives 18% of respondents a very 
negative opinion of DMR. 
Can mining risks be adequately addressed 
without Section 54 notices? 
78% responded yes and gave the following 
reasons: 
• IOMs can use Section 55 which gives 
requirements of what needs to be fixed 
without stopping operations. 
• Most of the shortfalls can be solved 
through discussions. 
• Better training could be a solution. 
• There should be less focus on 
production. 
• Internal mine penalties could work 
better. 
• Better mine standards could work. 
• There should be rewards for 
compliance. 
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One of the questions posed was the following - “In order to implement mine standards, what 
do you expect from DMR?”(Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11: Mine Personnel Expectation of the DMR 
 
Figure 11 shows the response which suggests the need for more regular inspections, use of 
best practice and collaboration with mines. This indicates that the DMR definitely plays a role 
in promoting adherence to standards and best practice.  Questions regarding enforcement of 
mine standards and the implementation of Section 54 notices are tabulated in Table 10. 
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4.2.4.1 Implementation	problems	of	Section	54s	
A question was asked regarding the enforcement and implementation of Section 54 in Table 
10. 
Table 10: Questions and Responses regarding enforcement and implemention of Section 
54s 
Question Response 
Does your institution have enforcement 
policies for Section 54 in place? 
The majority respondents, 64% of them 
responded Yes, and 28% of the responses 
were not sure. The results do indicate that 
policies do exist to deal with regard to 
Section 54 policies. 
Section 54 notices, when compared with 
other Inspectorate tools, has improved 
health & safety in the mining industry? 
80% of respondents said Yes, 10% said they 
are Not Sure, and another 10% said No or 
did not provide an answer. 
 
The questionnaire also asked, “What are the enforcement problems related to Section 54 
notices?”  This open-ended question allowed the respondents to highlight any problems that 
they had personally encountered regarding the enforcement of Section 54 stoppages.  The 
respondents sighted the following as problems areas: 
• Failure to comply with legislation (32%) 
• Production losses (15%)  
• The rest of the problems were highlighted as:- 
• No warning from IOMs 
• Arrogant IOMs 
• Accidents 
• Bribery and corruption 
• Loss of income 
• Instructions from IOM keep changing 
• Closure of mines 
• Long working hours to remedy noncompliance items 
• Low morale 
• Inconsistency of IOM application of the Section 54 instruction 
• Retraining of workers 
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• Employer frustrations 
• Competence of IOM 
• Lack of fairness on the side of IOMs 
• Complaints from third parties like farmers 
• Financial impacts not factored in by IOMs 
• Lack of communication between stakeholders 
• Job losses 
• Production losses 
• No assistance from IOMs 
• No work - no pay 
• Delays in lifting Section 54s 
• Lost bonuses 
 
Another question that provided flexible answers was the following – “What are the compliance 
problems related to Section 54 notices?”  The highest response was ‘production losses’ (33% 
of respondents). This question is similar to the last question but assists to validate previous 
answers and also to extract more answers. The following were the respondents’ answers:  
• Production losses . 
• Loss of revenue. 
• Presentations at DMR. 
• Extra costs to rectify sub-standards. 
• Delays in lifting Section 54 stoppage. 
• Inconsistency and subjectivity in the application of Section 54 stoppages by the 
IOMs. 
• The reactive solution to health and safety management. 
• Production pressure. 
• Procedures revised. 
• Unrealistic expectations by the IOMs. 
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• Cooperation from DMR side. 
• Effective monitoring of work systems. 
• Verbal instructions instead of written instructions. 
• Active and effective communication. 
• Health and Safety Committee involvement. 
• Health and safety culture. 
• Section 55 instructions. 
• Training. 
• Use of tripartite forums. 
 
Finally, to better understand the effectiveness of Section 54 stoppages, the questionnaire 
queried “What are the limitations of Section 54 stoppages?”  The responses to this question 
are outlined below:  
• There is no verification of the scene by the IOMs when a Section 54 is lifted. 
• Workers are not made to be accountable. 
• It affects workers’ remuneration. 
• Production and revenue loss for the mine. 
• Bribery and corruption associated around Section 54 instructions (in some cases). 
• Increased production costs. 
• At IOM discretion. 
• Reactive rather than proactive action.  
• Does not make proper management sustainable. 
• Can result in court actions. 
• Representations by the workforce and management are not allowed before Section 
54s are implemented. 
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• Erodes trust. 
• Workers believe Section 54 notices can result in mine closure and job losses. 
4.2.4.2 Impact	of	Section	54s	
The impacts of Section 54 stoppages were investigated through the following enquiries.  “What 
are the health and safety impacts of Section 54 enforcement?” Table 11 highlights the two-
pronged positive and negative responses and emphasises that the positive impacts of Section 
54s are dominant; namely, a safe work environment promotes compliance and improves health 
and safety.   
 
Table 11 depicts the financial impacts of Section 54 stoppages and the responses indicate the 
key impacts as a loss in revenue, profit loss, high operating costs, decrease in bonuses and 
production targets not achieved. 
Table 11: Impacts to Section 54 instructions 
Positive Response Negative Response 
Safe work environment Stressed employees 
Promotes compliance It increases risk of underground fires 
Improves health and safety Flooding due to no pumping 
Workers better understanding health & safety 
issues 
 
 
Figure 12 evaluates financial impacts of Section 54 instructions. Financial impacts in any 
business will affect its viability and those that depend on its profits and existence, the high 
financial impacts that come out strong are loss of revenue (34%), bonus decrease (8%),profit 
loss (21%), high operating costs (18%) and production targets lost (8%).Impacts of this nature 
can affect development of new projects that are meant to extend the life of operations ,marginal 
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collieries could close down with the resultant loss of employment and community 
developments associated with the viability of the colliery.  
 
Figure 12: Financial impacts of Section 54 instruction 
The question regarding the effect of Section 54 on the employees was asked.  “Does Section 
54 stoppages affect workers morale?” As seen in Figure 13, the responses strongly supports 
the claim that Section 54 stoppages affect workers morale with 70% of respondents answering 
yes.(Similar to findings at the Platinum mine).  A breakdown of the responses indicated that 
67% of senior management, 89% of middle management, 71% of supervisors, 81% of 
operators and 83% of general labourers (union members) responded yes.  
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Figure 13: Effect of Section 54s on employee morale 
 
The responses to the above question (Figure 13) are tabulated in Table 12 based on the 
employee’s broad job category. 
Table 12: Employee Job Category response to – Does Section 54s effect employee morale 
Does Section 54 stoppages affect workers morale? 
Employee Job Category  Yes No Don’t Know 
Senior Management 67 33 - 
Middle Management 89 - 11 
Supervisors 71 19 10 
Operators 81 18  
General Labour (Union member) 83 17 - 
 
The findings as shown in Section 4.2.1 from Impala Platinum demonstrate the negative effects 
on workers’ morale due to Section 54 notices, which are similar to results found on coal mines 
as illustrated by Figure 13. 
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The following question investigates how Section 54s affect a workers’ remuneration.  
Surprisingly, the respondents who said yes or no are almost similar in magnitude with 48% 
and 49% (Figure 14) respectively.   
 
Figure 14: Response to whether Section 54s affect a workers’ remuneration 
 
Of interest are the responses that answered that question - Do Section 54s reduce 
remuneration? The following qualifying remarks were made by the respondents:  
• Production bonuses get negatively affected.  
• Contractors are often put on hold.  
• Safety bonus is negatively affected. 
• Job losses can and do occur. 
• Fewer profits for the mine equate to a lower increase in wages and bonuses  
• No work - No pay policy by the mine 
 
It would appear from the responses that employees didn’t consider the bonus as 
“remuneration”, but as basic salary. 
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“Has Section 54 notices affected investment?”  The responses are overwhelming yes 
representing 56% yes as depicted in Figure 15. The response of “don’t know” is also a lot at 
33% and this could be because the question is difficult for the lower end workers; hence they 
could not answer it. 
 
Figure 15: Response to “Has Section 54 notices affected investment?” 
 
For the 56% respondents who answered yes Section 54 affects investments, their reasons for 
saying yes are outlined below; 
• Investors are afraid to lose money.  
• Marginal mines cannot afford a Section 54 stoppages. 
• Stoppages make profits minimal.  
• Stoppages increase overhead costs.  
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• Stoppages decrease the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of production projects.  
• Stoppages lower dividends paid out.  
• Mine stoppages equate to no production. 
•  Additional money is spent to comply to mine standards  
• No production - No money  
• Stoppages reduce production output 
• No profit due to Section 54 stoppages 
• More stoppages mean no business  
• Penalties bring financial losses  
• Section 54 issued recklessly is detrimental to investment  
• When the mine is stopped, investors lose money, and more capital is required to fix 
problems 
 
The responses to the question “has Section 54 notices affected investment” is further broken 
down into employees job category and is shown in Table 13 tabulated below:- 
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Table 13: Employee Job Category response to - Does Section 54s affect investment  
Has Section 54 notices affected investment? 
Employee Job Category Yes No Don’t Know 
Senior Management 67 8 25 
Middle Management 67 - 33 
Supervisors 62 10 29 
Operators 55 10 36 
Labour Organisation on the mine 83 - 17 
 
The responses to the question “has Section 54 notices affected investment?”, has an 
overwhelming “yes” response, 67% by Senior Management, 67% by Middle Management, 
62% by Supervisors, 55% by Operators, and 83% by Labour Organisations (Labour) 
represented on the mine. The “don’t know” response is also significant as they range from 17% 
to 36% amongst the employee job categories. It however not clear which investment is 
affected, whether external as outside investors investing in the company or internal as in 
developmental projects on the mine. The implicit response is that there is a perception that the 
pool of internal developmental funds is reduced, which could be extended to the reduction of 
community developmental funds as in Figure 16.   
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Figure 16: Response to “has Section 54 notices affected community projects” 
 
In terms of the impact of Section 54 stoppages on community projects (Figure 16) respondents 
were provided with three choices; yes, no and don’t know. The “don’t know” responses 
represented 43% of those surveyed, 34% of the respondents replied yes, and 19% responded 
no. One can explain the high “don’t know” responses as coming from lower end workforce as 
they are less privy of such information and supports the claim by the workforce that 
communication around Section 54s needs to improve.  The respondents who replied yes to 
the above question provided their opinion on how community projects are affected by Section 
54s.  Their responses are outlined below: - 
• Community suppliers to the mine are affected by budget cuts  
• Social responsibility stops when the mine closes 
• Projects put on hold as finances dwindle  
• Fewer profits to fund community projects  
• Mine not meeting targets and therefore has no money for projects 
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• No support from the mine 
• No funding for community projects 
• The mine is no longer able to assist 
• Road projects stop when the mine is not operating 
• Projects hosted by mine for the community will be stopped 
• Social Labour Plans (SLP) have no budget to fulfil the requirements of the SLP 
• Delays in allocating money to projects 
• Commitments to communities affected 
• Closed mines have no budgets 
 
The question “has Section 54 notices affected community projects” is broken down into 
employees job category and is shown in Table 14 tabulated below:- 
Table 14: Employee Job Category response to - Does Section 54s affect Community 
Projects  
Does Section 54 stoppages affect Community Projects? 
Employee Job Category Yes No Don’t Know 
Senior Management 33 8 58 
Middle Management 22 11 67 
Supervisors 38 19 43 
Operators 27 18 55 
Labour Organisation on the mine 50 50 - 
 
The responses to the question - “has community projects been affected by Section 54 
notices?”, have a significant percentage of “don’t knows” responses, with 58% the responses 
by Senior Management answering “don’t know”, while 67% ascribed to Middle Management, 
43% to Supervisors and 55% to Operators replying that they didn’t know the effect of Section 
54s on community projects. The “yes” are significant too with Senior Management at 33%, 
Middle Management at 22%, Supervisors at 38%, Operators at 27% and Labour Organisation 
representatives on the mine at 50% (Table 14). 
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Workers were asked if Section 54 notices are positive or harmful to the mining industry. The 
majority of the respondents said yes (54%) and those that answered with a “yes and no” 
represented 34% of the respondents as shown in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: Response to “Are Section 54 notices positive or negative to the mining industry?” 
 
The reasons for those that answered yes and no are listed below:- 
• Promotes safety at the mines. 
• Causes money loss (loss in revenue).  
• Promotes health and safety.  
• Causes production losses.  
• Promotes compliance.  
• Demotivate employees.  
• Changes employees’ mindset.  
• Has reduced the number of accidents. 
• Improves working standards. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Yes No Yes and No Did not answer
Are Section 54 notices positive or negative to the mining 
industry?
 
 
78 
• Frustrates workers when they are close to their bonus targets. 
• Helps to improve mine standards.  
• Is negative in a struggling economy. 
• Makes policeman out of inspectors. 
• Positive on safety but negative for production and costs. 
 
 Research	Outcomes	
The mine’s stakeholders have done exceptionally well in educating their lower level employees 
in mine health and safety. It seems that the lower level employees have faith in the government, 
and therefore they are more receptive to the DMR. Seventy-two percent (72%) of the 
employees prefer to communicate directly with IOM, as opposed through their supervisors.  
 
There is a significant drop in production when a Section 54 instruction is issued, and there is 
no doubt that overall morale will be affected. More than 50% of the respondents indicated that 
there is no bonus payment, as invariably, Section 54 entails extra work, which is not calculated 
in the bonus scheme. Most of the employees interviewed (98%) understand that Section 54s 
require a work stoppage and that remedial action is required before normal operations can 
resume. Almost all the employees agree to participate in remedial work after a Section 54 has 
been issued so that their bonuses will be quickly reinstated - only 2% were unwilling to 
cooperate. Further, employees acknowledged behavioural change because of the Section 54 
stoppage in their workplace. However, the workers acknowledged that the loss in additional 
revenue adversely affects their morale and often demoralised workers. Workers felt that 
Section 54 stoppages had little to do with them yet the stoppage financially impacts them. 
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A large proportion of mine employees (80%) believe that Section 54s are applied fairly. The 
belief of the mine employees indicates that the workers trust the inspector’s (IOM) judgement 
and also indicates that mine employees have functional risk assessment and hazard 
identification skills. However, not all the employees agree with a small proportion (20%) of the 
employees not viewing Section 54s as being fairly applied. The research attributes this to 
different levels of education and understanding of the MHSA. The following attitudes by 
mineworkers towards Section 54s and IOM were recorded: 
• Employees prefer IOM to visit the shaft regularly. 
• Employees prefer IOM to close only noncompliant panels instead of the entire shaft. 
• Employees prefer the time allocated for Section 54s remedial action to be reduced. 
• Employees prefer IOM to provide a recommendation on how to ensure compliance. 
• Employees want Section 54s instructions to be fairly applied. 
• Employees acknowledge that the more trained and skilled employees are more 
agreeable to complying with health and safety standards. 
• Employees report that Section 54s affect their moral, as employees realise that 
Section 54 instructions may affect their job security.  
 
The findings on the negative effects on workers’ morale due to Section 54s on coal mines are 
overwhelming as illustrated by Figure 13 in Chapter 4, which is corroborated by results 
gathered from Impala platinum shafts. 
 
4.3 Chapter	Summary	
There were significant revenue losses from the two collieries that supplied financial data 
relating to Section 54 stoppages.  Collieries S and T are owned by different companies and 
one colliery is situated in Mpumalanga whilst the other is in the KwaZulu-Natal province.  
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Interestingly, for both collieries the revenue loss of 1-days of Section 54 stoppage is 
approximately R1 080 000. 
 
The chapter  also highlights how workers are primarily demoralised by bonus losses that are 
caused by Section 54 notices, while at the same time the workers feel the work stoppages 
from Section 54 stoppages are not their fault but mine management. 
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5 RESEARCH	RESULTS	AND	INTERPRETATION		
 Chapter	Overview	
This chapter discusses the analysis of the research findings from the literature reviews and 
questionnaires.  
 Literature	review	
The South African mining industry has been losing many lives prior to 2005 as discussed in 
Chapter 2 and rightfully Section 54 stoppages became a desperate measure to deal with a 
desperate situation. In the book, Beyond The Consent of the Governed Farnham (2016) a 
desperate measure means any intervention to correct is permissible, which in the case of mine 
stoppages invites uncensored mines Inspector’s discretion on what is grave non-compliance. 
An interview with the chief safety officer of one colliery on the 22nd March 2017 provides an 
example with some of the requirements a colliery has to contend with in order for a Section 54 
stoppage to be lifted. A delegation has to leave the colliery to go and present their strategies 
to improve on their compliance to the Principal Inspectors office in Witbank. In this example, 
the presentation was scheduled for a Friday; however, the delegation on their arrival was told 
to come back on a Monday because the Principal Inspector had left. Also, the delegation as 
per the Mines Inspectorate requirement comprised of the general manager, chief safety officer, 
health and safety representative, union representative, head of underground operations, 
engineering manager, section engineer and SHE committee members. With such critical 
employees being absent from the colliery very few decisions can be made. 
 
It is also learnt from the Mine Safety and Health Act of the USA in Chapter 2 of having an 
enforcement policy, which is designed to eliminate victimisation and bring about “firm and fair 
enforcement” by the enforcing government policy.  It is fair to argue that in certain documented 
Section 54 stoppages fairness has been compromised. 
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In Germany, the Mining Policy has a goal of sustainability.  South Africa can learn from this 
approach that if the economic effects of mine stoppages are ignored then indirectly social 
development through the social and labour plans of mines and economic growth of the country 
will also be negatively affected. This means that the DMR should consider the overall benefits 
costs of Section 54 stoppages to be greater than the costs of enforcement. 
 
It is clear from Chapter 2 international literature review that targeted mine stoppages do require 
comprehensive enforcement policies and should be based on risk assessment or mine ratings 
of its systems and also on intelligence gathering. 
 
In Chapter 2 the literature shows that some countries like Germany, achieve good results in 
compliance by the mines by adopting in some cases a service provider approach which entails 
bettering cooperation between the state and mine operators. Mine stoppages have a 
“preventative” focus instead of “punitive” focus. Also, in Chapter 2 it is observed that a good 
enforcement policy seems the best manner to promote compliance.  
 
As commented in Chapter 2 from documented literature that punishment produces customs of 
opposition, which in South Africa is manifested in legal actions, less commitment to social and 
labour plans and job losses. 
 
Also, in the USA. coal mines good intentioned mine operators stop complying when they are 
over punished as the glue of cooperation which is trust and respect is destroyed.  
 
MCSA revealed that Section 54s stoppages caused losses of R4.84b in revenues in 2015 and 
the mentioned losses excluded payments to workers without production and costs of restarting 
operations. In the same article, the MCSA accepts Section 54 as a legal instrument but 
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questions the application of the instrument, no doubt that is an erosion of trust and respect 
between major stakeholders.  
 
Lovells (2016) sees Section 54 mine stoppages as bringing a culture of avoidance not of 
improvement in standards of health and safety. However, in contrast, the Tharisa integrated 
annual report to shareholders (Cyprus, 2015) points out the shortfalls in production due to 
Section 54 stoppages. 
 
MCSA 2016 survey that 35% of Section 54 issued in 2015 should have been Section 55, 
meaning there would not have been mine stoppages for the 35% cases and legal action was 
not a preferred option because of fear of the Mines Inspectorate. 
 
Peyper (2017) points out that the GDP contribution by the South African mining industry has 
shrunk by 0.4% between 2012 and 2016, also in the same period profits went down by 48% 
and paid dividends went down by 52%. Also, the power of uncertainty in legislation is made 
evident by the losses of R2.7billion in lost mining stocks holding pension funds a few hours 
after the announcement of the new mining charter.  Which means unpleasant legislation can 
influence investors to take their investments outside South Africa or put their investments in 
other industries. 
 
Burkhardt and Crowley (2017) points out that in the last five years the South African mining 
industry has lost 60 000 jobs because of regulatory policies. Odendaal (2017) quoted the 
COM on their agreement with former Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba “It was agreed with the 
Minister that further engagement is necessary, as a struggling mining sector has a material 
dampening effect on the whole economy, including the ability of the Treasury to collect tax 
revenue.”  
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Research has revealed some unintended consequences of:- 
• Loss of production tonnages 
• Loss of business due to inability to supply clients 
• Excessive overheads  
• Extra costs to meet requirements of lifting Section 54 stoppages 
• Workers momentum and morale dropping due to Section 54 work disturbances 
• On the positive; improved training, supervision, implementation of systems, 
monitoring programmes, mining standards, compliance with the MHSA, decline in 
mine related injuries and fatalities 
 
What are the negative impacts identified:- 
• Mine employees loss of work morale due to frustration of breaking their routine when 
they have to stop to fix workings 
• Loss of production bonuses for mine employees 
• Security of mine employees jobs put to jeopardy 
• Production in tonnes produced is reduced 
• Profit made by the mines is reduced 
• Country’s economy is affected due to losses incurred by mines  
• Law suites to the Mines Inspectorate 
 
Training gives the workforce new knowledge and certain answers that supposedly should 
come from management are seen in junior employees’ answers in the questionnaires. It makes 
good argument to say Section 54s have contributed in the reduction of fatal accidents over the 
years but mining employers also know that reduction in mine accidents increases profitability 
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of mining operations. Studies in U.S.A. underground coal mines showed that financial gain was 
directly proportional to safety. 
 
The design of Section 54 presupposes that mining entities do not stop risky operations except 
if compelled to cease dangerous works or acts by statute (UCT Faculty of Law 2018). It can 
follow then that the challenges of the implementation of Section 54 is a revelation of a flawed 
inception piece of statute. Also, IOMs have been observed to be going beyond their legal 
mandate in the use Section 54 to influence LRA (Mining ENSight, 2013). No doubt that 
becomes an enticement for legal action against the DMR. 
 
Barker (2008) outlines the “unintended consequences” in mining when speaking at a safety 
summit. For the purposes of this dissertation, Barker’s comments on unintended 
consequences that are used in the research to discuss the unintended impacts of the use of 
Section 54s has on the coal mining industry:- 
• If Section 54s can be described as a badly designed piece of legislation at inception, 
unintended outcomes will show during implementation. 
• If not checked Section 54s can go down in history as having harmed the workers that 
it intended to protect. 
• If Section 54s are applied “punitively”, positive results in the form of reduction in mine 
accidents may result in the short-term, however may not achieve long term goal of 
zero harm.  In addition, when the application of a Section 54 is used as a punishment, 
the root causes of accidents will not be identified or be rectified, which will mean 
similar accidents will occur in the future.   
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• The overuse of Section 54s can force operators to practice minimum compliance 
requirements to prevent IOM issuing Section 54, however this practice may promote 
mines to stop focusing on best industry practice. 
• Abuse of Section 54 stoppages can demotivate high performing senior personnel and 
if they leave the industry poor safety standards may start manifesting themselves. 
• Section 54 stoppages as they are currently used, are blame culture orientated which 
is anti-stakeholder co-operation hence cannot sustain health and safety standards on 
the mines. 
 
 Analysis	of	Questionnaire	
The following section discusses the analysis based on the responses provided from the 
Questionnaire.  
 
5.3.1 Collaboration	between	DMR,	workforce	and	management	
From the respondents it is deduced that it is widely accepted (+95%) by all parties that Section 
54 instructions promote health and safety in the workplace and that the responsibility is shared 
by all interested and affected parties.  
 
Plus 75% of the respondents believed that Section 54s stoppages are fairly applied and that 
the workforce has a role to play in the prevention of Section 54 notices. While 24% disagreed 
and were of the opinion that Section 54 stoppages has nothing to do with workforce nor do 
they have the capacity to prevent Section 54s and their primary focus is production.  
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The research indicates that Section 54 instructions contribute towards the promotion of good 
health and safety practices. Regular mine visits by IOMs is perceived to promote health and 
safety in the workplace. Of Interest, is that +75% of the participants of the questionnaire believe 
that Section 54s are fairly applied and that the workforce has a role to play in the proper 
adherence to mine standards i.e. prevention of Section 54.  This is in contrast to the 
commentary made by the NUM representative whom advocated that the workforce had no 
responsibility in regard to Section 54s. The fact that only 24% of the participants don’t feel they 
have the responsibility to prevent Section 54s, indicates the need for management to 
communicate to all levels of workers the importance in the prevention of Section 54s and the 
promotion of good compliance to mine procedures and standards. 
 
The research contends that the promotion of a “we” culture is one of the primary steps to 
improving mine health and safety, as a “us and them” is prevalent in the South African mining 
culture and desperately needs to change. 
 
5.3.2 Knowledge	of	Section	54	stoppages	
The study can summate from the responses that the knowledge and understanding of Section 
54 instructions are well understood by all parties – the workforce, management and the DMR. 
Over 90% of the workforce and management and 87% of all respondents acknowledge that 
the mines have policies, procedures and standards to reduce the impact of Section 54 
stoppages. A further 78% note that management utilises safety performance incentives to also 
reduce Section 54s.  Furthermore, the majority of participants are of the opinion that the IOMs 
fully understand the implications of issuing a Section 54 notice. 
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5.3.3 Capacity	of	DMR	to	administer,	implement	and	enforce	mine	standards	
The capacity of the DMR to administer the implementation of mine standards by the mines was 
explored.  The purposes of the question were to gain an understanding from the three main 
parties, mine management, the work force, and DMR, on whether they believe the DMR have 
the technical knowledge and experience to implement and enforce mine standards. 
 
The majority of the respondents (82%) were of the opinion that the DMR or Inspector of Mines 
had the technical knowledge and experience to administer mine standards.  However, 18% of 
the respondents had very negative opinions regarding the capacity of the DMR stating the low 
salaries that Inspector of Mines receive is one of the causes to the poor quality of the DMR. 
The no respondents also cited that the DMR personnel lack experience, have unrealistic 
expectations and enforce the regulation in an inconsistent manner. 
 
A follow up question asked the participants if mining risks could be addressed with the use of 
Section 54 instructions. Again, a majority (78%) of the respondents felt that mining risks can 
be properly addressed without the issuance of Section 54 stoppages. The respondents  
provided the following reasons: -   
• IOMs can use Section 55 which gives requirements of what needs to be fixed without 
stopping operations. 
• Most of the short falls can be solved through discussions. 
• Better training could be a solution. 
• There should be less focus on production. 
• Internal mine penalties could work better. 
• Better mine standards could work. 
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• There should be rewards for compliance. 
 
Although the majority of the respondents were of the belief that mine safety and risk could be 
managed without the use of Section 54 instructions, many respondents stated that they would 
like to see more visits from the DMR to enforce standards but also to assist and collaborate 
with the mines to achieve best practice in regard to mine standards. This suggests that the 
DMR definitely plays a role in promoting adherence to standards and best practice. The 
questionnaire also indicates that a significant number of respondents (28%) were not sure if 
the mine properly enforced their standards (enforcement policies), which supports the previous 
statement regarding the importance of DMR to promote adherence to mine standards.  The 
importance of the DMR’s role in adherence and enforcement of mine standards is highlighted 
by the fact that only 10% of the respondents were of the opinion that Section 54s instructions 
have not improved health and safety. 
 
In regard to enforcement open-ended questions were used to evaluate the effectiveness and 
the resultant problems of the enforcement of mine standards through Section 54 instructions. 
Respondents identified failure to comply with legislation i.e. mine standards (32%) as the major 
reason for Section 54 stoppages and noted that the resultant impact of the Section 54 notices 
is the loss of production (33%).  The respondents also highlighted a number of short comings 
in the Section 54 process, for example: - 
• There is no verification of the scene by the IOMs when a Section 54 is lifted. 
• Workers are not made to be accountable. 
• Bribery and corruption associated around Section 54 instructions (in some cases). 
• Inconsistency and subjectivity in Section 54 stoppages by the IOMs 
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• Representations by the workforce and management are not allowed before Section 
54s are implemented 
• Unrealistic expectations by the IOMs 
 
In terms of what the respondents found to be effective tools for the enforcement of mine health 
and safety were: - 
• Cooperation from DMR side including Section 55 instructions. 
• Effective monitoring and training of work systems. 
• Verbal instructions and effective communication. 
• Health and Safety Committee involvement, as well as the use of tripartite forums 
• Promoting a health and safety culture 
 
5.3.4 Morale	and	remuneration	
The breakdown of respondents regarding the effect of Section 54 on workers morale indicates 
that employee morale is affected from senior management down to general labourers. Section 
54 affects everyone and all parties on the mine. The loss of morale is probably a symptom of 
employees feeling uncertain to when the next Section 54 stoppages will be enforced, the 
duration of the Section 54 stoppage, and the effect of Section 54 on bonus.  
 
5.3.5 Community	and	investment	
The question around community and investment (“Has community projects been affected by 
Section 54 notices?”) was used to test Gloy’s (2014) findings that Section 54s negatively 
affected the investment in the surrounding community. However, the questionnaire indicated 
that workers (labour) were divided in yes and no responses. The response by labour is most 
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likely based on their individual experience around the local community, some being positive 
while others negative.  However, the remaining employees indicated a significant number of 
“don’t know” responses. The large number of “don’t know” responses in not unexpected, as 
often the social licence to operate is managed at an executive committee (exco) level or at 
board level. Noting that Senior Managers are not the direct custodians of the MPRDA 
compliance requirements. It is not anticipated that mine employees would be fully aware of the 
direct consequence of Section 54 notices on community investments. Most responses to this 
question are based on the perception of the individuals, which gives comfort to the study in 
that the responses concerning community projects are not based on employers ‘awareness 
training of sub-standards that bring about Section 54 stoppages. Notably, one of the Senior 
Managers provided a name of a village whose projects were affected due to Section 54, this 
particular Senior Manager requested to remain anonymous and the name of the village to 
remain confidential. 
 
 Chapter	Summary	
Section 54 mine stoppages do produce positive results, such as a reduction of mine accidents, 
improved safety standards and training; whilst at the same time causing losses and miss-trust 
among the stakeholders (government inspectorate, mine owners and mine workers).  The 
research indicates the need for strong policies and effective implementation of legal 
instruments like Section 54 by IOMs. This premise is backed by lessons learnt from other 
countries in that their equivalents of Section 54 are implemented with a goal of achieving 
economic sustainability. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS	AND	RECOMMENDATIONS	
Recommendations are made regarding the implementation of Section 54s and Section 55s in 
the coal mining sector and recommendations made regarding the drive to lower South Africa’s 
injury to those of international mining countries such as USA, Canada and Australia. 
 
From 2007 to 2016 the fatality rate has shown a steady decline.  However, the question 
remains on whether Section 54s may have served their purpose and that some other 
intervention is now required to progress South Africa’s fatality rate to an international 
benchmark of less than 0,10 fatalities per 1 million hours worked. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS		
Section 54s have played an important role in the reduction of mine fatalities since 2005 with 
mine fatalities reducing from 200 in 2005, to a low of 73 in 2016. A similar trend was found with 
the South African coal mining industry, which contributed 16 fatalities in 2005 but only four in 
2016.  However, since 2016 the sharp decline in mine fatalities has flattened with the industry 
reporting a total of 88 fatalities in 2017 and 81 fatalities in 2018. It could be argued that Section 
54s alone may not have resulted in the sharp decline in fatalities since 2005, as the mining 
industry has initiated several programmes to address the high incidents of fatal accidents. 
However, with Section 54s enabling the DMR to close entire mines, shafts, or sections in the 
event of a safety breach, Section 54, and the initiatives to prevent Section 54 stoppages has 
drawn significant attention from mine management and corporate. Thus, supporting the 
premise behind Section 54s instructions that Section 54s provide remedial action to avoid a 
repeat of the accident. In addition, the economic impact of Section 54s act as a negative 
incentive to improve safety. 
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However, the question as to whether all Section 54 stoppages are necessary and is the DMR 
overzealous in its approach to enforce Section 54 instructions remains a concern to the general 
mining industry.  The literature review indicates that the mining industry has lost a significant 
amount of revenue with some R13.63 Billion lost between 2012 and 2015 due to Section 54 
stoppages. Noting that during the 2012 to 2015 period about 60% of the mining companies 
experienced a rapid increase in Section 54s.  Since the November 2016 court case ruling 
favouring AngloGold Ashanti’s vs the DMR there has been a decrease in Section 54 notices 
and limited to specific areas of the infringement. Since 2016, health and safety inspectorate 
annual report provided by the DMR have been providing Section 54s as a percentage of 
transgression rather than the actual number of Section 54 notices.  Thus, one cannot 
determine the actual number of Section 54 issuances for the year. 
 
The design and implementation of Section 54 instructions in its simplest form presupposes that 
mining entities do not stop risk operations except if compelled to cease dangerous works or 
acts by statute. It can then be questioned if the implementation of Section 54 notices is a flawed 
piece of statute. This is supported by claims from mining companies’ that shortfalls in 
production and revenues are associated with Section 54 stoppages. Also, IOM have been 
observed to be going beyond their legal mandate in the use Section 54 instructions.  
 
Based on interviews and questionnaires with coal mine management, there was a strong 
response by management that Section 54 instructions had a negative financial impact on 
operations.  In addition, management felt some Section 54 notices were unlawful, however, at 
the time, the mines chose not take legal action. But this may no longer be the case, as mines 
have begun to go to court over Section 54 stoppages (e.g. Anglogold Ashanti vs DMR in 2016). 
Although management agreed that Section 54 notices had a positive impact on safety, 
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management also held the opinion that the DMR should review the Section 54 strategy and 
goals; especially in light of the impact of Section 54 stoppages decreasing over last couple of 
years.   
 
The following findings are made:- 
• Section 54 instructions contribute towards the promotion of good health and safety 
practices.  The fact that only 24% of the participants don’t feel they have the 
responsibility to prevent Section 54s, indicates the need for management to 
communicate to all levels of workers the importance of good compliance to mine 
procedures and standards thus resulting in the reduction of Section 54 notices. 
• The knowledge and understanding of Section 54 instructions are well understood by 
all parties; the workforce, management and the DMR. 
• Based on the research, the workers, including operators, understood that Section 54 
notices caused a reduction in production resulting in lower profits or the mine losing 
money.  Importantly, the workers also acknowledge that Section 54 instructions 
resulted in an improvement in safety.  Operators were of the opinion that Section 55s 
should be used in place of Section 54s, this comment is most likely driven by the fact 
that operators stand to lose more financially by Section 54 stoppages due to the 
production.  
• The skilled workers, and supervisors found Section 54s helpful in promoting visible 
leadership and encouraged everyone to implement mine standards, which made the 
mine safer.  On the negative side, skilled labour and supervisors found Section 54s 
to be demoralising for workers and resulted in a loss of production and income for the 
mine, as well as loss of bonus for workers and supervisors. 
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• Middle and senior management had a balanced view regarding Section 54 stoppages. 
Positive attributes identified were improved training, monitoring and risk management, 
better compliance to mine standards and a decline in mine related injuries and 
fatalities.  The negative aspects is some Section 54 stoppages are viewed as being 
unfairly applied, the loss of production associated with stoppages negatively impacts 
on the revenue of the operation, and Section 54s notices reduce workers moral. 
• The DMR response was similar to the above and as the issuer of Section 54 notices 
the Inspectors found Section 54 to assist in the promotion of training to employees, 
improved and safer worker environment, better compliance to the MHSA, promotes 
the appointment of qualified and skilled workers, and contributes to the reduction of 
mine accidents. The DMR were also well aware of the loss of production and negative 
financial impact that Section 54 stoppages had on the mine. The DMR also 
recognised that employees lost income due to the stoppages, as well as being 
demoralised by Section 54 stoppages as worker become frustrated by breaking their 
mining routine.  Notably, the DMR, subsequent to the November 2016 law suit, are 
now more reluctant to issue Section 54 notices and subsequently have focused their 
efforts with small mining companies whom have be negligent in following the MHSA. 
 
In conclusion, the use of Section 54s notices may not be always appropriately applied, whereby 
mines, shafts or sections are closed due the implementation of a Section 54 instruction. In 
many cases it could be queried whether a Section 55 would be a more appropriate response 
to substandard or actions. Section 54 notices definitely have a negative impact on production, 
income and morale; but have also significantly reduced fatalities. 
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 RECOMMENDATIONS	AND	WAY	FORWARD	
The synthesis of implementing sustainable health and safety in the mining industry is being 
ignored which among other things includes good rapport amongst stakeholders, in this 
instance the key stakeholders being the employers, DMR, organised labour and ultimately the 
MHSC, which actually puts the stakeholders together. The MHSC’s role is to make suggestions 
to the minister of DMR on issues of health and safety regulatory framework and on results of 
health and safety research. The research queries if this isn’t the right time for the MHSC to re-
look at Section 54 for possible amendment?  
 
Looking at the relationships between the Enforcement Pyramid tools as discussed in Chapter 
1 “Information and Education” is at the bottom of the pyramid and “Section 54” is in the middle 
of the pyramid. The Enforcement Pyramid is well designed as a policy guide for the practical 
enforcement of health and safety by the Inspector of Mines.  Jeffery (2017) quoting Professor 
Weissenberg of Rhodes University highlights the belief that the DMR’s eager resort to Section 
54 is a symptom of a much larger problem. It reflects the government’s outrage at the industry  
and the DMR’s apparent belief that its IOM have both a moral and a legal duty to bring mining 
companies to heel.  Based on the DMR’s, and by implication the government, desire to create 
the greatest impact of Section 54 on the mining industry it would appear that the use of Section 
54’s have migrated to the base of the Enforcement Pyramid.  
 
However, the mining industry is of the opinion that the legislation is unfriendly leading to 
thousands of jobs being lost in the mining industry over the past seven years with billions of 
Rand in revenue being lost.  The industry believes that long stoppages associated with Section 
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54s turns profitable mines into loss making operations with some senior mining executives 
seeing prolonged Section 54 stoppages as retribution. 
 
Another consideration regarding Section 54s is the fact that since 2010 the occupational health 
and safety of workers, governed by the Mine Health and Safety Act of 1996, has been 
incorporated into the 2010 Mining Charter. From onset the Mining Charter goals have been to 
transform the mining industry in all aspects, which resulted in that as from 2010 occupational 
health and safety is part of mining industry transformation programmes. Undoubtedly Section 
54 mine stoppages since 2005 have contributed in occupational health safety transformation. 
Section 54 instructions are a part of the whole synthesis in progressing mine health and safety 
towards the goal of zero harm in the mining industry. But the plateauing of mine fatalities in 
2017 necessitates an urgent intervention to create a step change in mine health and safety. 
The impact of Section 54 mine instructions is now minimal, ineffective and mostly producing 
negative impacts and a new strategy is now required. Review of the baseline causes to safety 
and health transgressions should be investigated. This transformation will require the DMR to 
take counsel from all stakeholders so that transformation process can be sustainable to the 
mining industry. 
 
The need to transform occupational health and safety has been advocated by the mining 
charter and the 2018 mining summit has gone further to set a goal for that transformation which 
is zero fatalities by 2020. For this goal to be met health and safety management with 
implementation has to be transformed, including the attitudes and relationships of all the 
stakeholders. 
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Progress on health and safety enforcement and implementation can no longer be simplistically 
measured as reduction of fatal accident numbers, more variables should include such as 
reduction in negative impacts as that is the only way the mining industry can transform 
occupational health and safety in a sustainable manner. Sustainable mining cannot in the long 
term be achieved by applying a “punitive policy” in the form of the overuse of Section 54 
stoppages. 
 
There are certainly issues that will need to be addressed to manage the correct implementation 
of Section 54 notices in a responsible and appropriate manner:- 
• There is certainly a prevalence of a culture of “we” and not “we” and “them” in the 
mining industry which solicits that the MHSC should re-visit its pledges contained in 
the annual report of 2015/2016; of being a “Trusted Advisor” to the DMR, to assist in 
the “Promotion of Occupational Health and Safety Culture, and  “Zero Harm”.  
• The MQA should see to it that its own mandate as per MHSA (Act No.74 of 2008) of 
implementing effective education, training and skills to the Inspectors of Mines and 
Mine Employees is adequate. 
• The captains of the South African mining industry need to realise that mine design 
issues, compliance of standards, and other conditions that give impedance to Section 
54 instructions need to be enhanced. 
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8 APPENDIX		
 
 
        
 
ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF SECTION 
54 ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINING 
INDUSTRY 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
1. Please use a pen or pencil to complete the questionnaire, and mark each answer clearly. 
 
2. Please follow the instructions carefully. 
 
3. Please mark only one box to indicate your answers. Mark a box by placing either a tick or a cross in 
it – for example, 
 
Or 
 
THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE THIS IMPORTANT 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
b r 
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Biographical Information  
 
(1.1)  Name of Province 
 
 
  
 
(1.2) Name of Mine/Organisation 
 
 
 
 (2)  Your designation or occupation 
 
  (1) @  Chief Safety Officer   
 
 (2) @  Mine Manager 
 
 (3) @  DMR Inspectorate 
 
(4) @  Labour Organisation 
 
(5) @  Other, Please Specify 
 
 
  
(3)  Commodity of the Mine  
 
 (1) @  Gold  
 
 (2) @  Platinum 
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 (3) @  Coal 
 
 (4) @  Diamond 
 
(5) @  Other, please specify 
 
 
 
2. COLLABORATION AMONGST, DMR EMPLOYER & LABOUR  
1. Do you acknowledge DMR’s contribution in promoting Health & Safety with the 
enforcement of section 54 of the MHSA?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  If no, why? (Please specify) 
  
 
2. Do you acknowledge the employer’s contribution in implementing all the 
requirements of section 54 notices? 
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  If no, why? (Please specify) 
 
3. Do you acknowledge labour’s contribution in accepting the implementing of section 
54 notices?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
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 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  If no, why? (Please specify) 
  
 
 
4. Do you believe that employers are willing to avoid the issuance of section 54 notices?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  If no, why? (Please specify) 
  
 
5. Do you believe that section 54 is applied fairly by the Inspectorate?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  If no, why? (Please specify) 
  
 
6. Do you believe that LABOUR is capable to implement section 54?  
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  If no, why? (Please specify)  
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3. KNOWLEDGE OF SECTION 54 
 
Do you have an understanding of section 54?  
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
If YES, explain below?  
 
 
 
 
 
Do you think your employer fully understands the implications of section 54?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  If no, why? (Please specify) 
 
 
 
Which of the following has capacity to implement section 54? (Rank them i.e. good = a, 
better = b and best = c)  
(1) @  INSPECTORATE 
 
 (2) @  EMPLOYER 
 
(3) @  UNION  
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Does a policy exist for workers on what to do, in order to reduce the issuance of section 
54s?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
Do you think Inspectors of Mines fully understand the implications of section 54?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  If no, why? (Please specify) 
 
 
Does your employer demonstrate competence in implementing mine standards?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  If Yes, what are the reasons? (Please specify) 
 
 
Do you believe your employer fully complies with mine standards? 
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  Motivate your response  
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Does your employer use safety performance incentive to reduce the issuance of section 
54s? 
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
How effective is the Inspectorate in enforcing section 54 legislation? Rate your response 
in the score 1 (good) to 3 (weak).  
 
(1) @   
 
 (2) @    
 
(3) @    
 
 
4. CAPACITY TO IMPLEMENT MINE STANDARDS 
 
In order to implement mine standards, what do you expect from DMR?  
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In order to enforce MHSA, you need high technical knowledge & experience.  
Do you think DMR has got that?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  If no, what is the main reason? (Please specify) 
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Does mine management have the will to do hazard identification & risk assessment at the 
mine?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
To what extent have you been involved in risk assessment? Rate your score 1(good) to 
3(not at all)  
 
(1) @   
 
 (2) @    
 
(3) @   
 
Can mining risks be adequately addressed without section 54 notices?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  If no, what other ways can be used? (Please specify) 
 
 
Do you have access to the MHSA law book?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
If YES who supplied it? 
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(1) @  A publishing company 
 
 (2) @  From a website 
 
(3) @  OTHER (Please specify) 
 
 
When was your MHSA law book last updated? State the month.    
 
@                
 
5. ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 54 
Does your institution have enforcement policies for section 54 in place?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  Not sure  
 
Where do you believe section 54 legislation can be used most effectively? (Rank them i.e. 
good = a, better = b and best = c)  
(1) @  Monitoring  
 
 (2) @  Inspecting  
 
(3) @  Observing  
 
(4) @       Auditing 
 
(5)   @     Other (Please specify) 
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The section 54s are playing a major role in the enforcement & compliance of the MHSA. 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  If no, what is playing a major role (Please specify) 
  
 
 
6. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS OF SECTION 54 
 
What are the enforcement problems related to section 54? 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
What are the compliance problems related to section 54 notices?  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Has your employer been issued with a section 54 notice this year? 
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  Don’t know 
If yes, how many times?  
 
Which is more effective in promoting compliance to MHSA?  
 
(1) @  An administrative fine 
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 (2) @  A section 54 instruction  
 
(3) @  Other (Please specify) 
 
--- -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - -- - - - - -- - 
 
Does the enforcement of section 54 promote innovation in OHS? Mark only one box   
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  Not sure 
 
Section 54 notices when compared with other Inspectorate tools has improved health & 
safety in the mining industry?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  Not sure 
 
If No, please explain below? 
 
What are the limitations of section 54 stoppages?  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Is section 54 stoppages more suitable for larger mining operations? 
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(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  Don’t know 
 
Is section 54 more suitable for smaller mining operations?  
 
 (1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  Don’t know 
 
7. IMPACTS OF SECTION 54 
 
What are the health & safety impacts of section 54 enforcement? 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
What are the financial impacts of section 54 compliance? 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Has community projects been affected by section 54 notices? 
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  Don’t know 
 
Please explain below if answer is Yes or No? 
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Does section 54 stoppages affect workers morale?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
(2) @  No 
 
(3) @  Don’t know 
 
 
Do you believe section 54 notices reduce workers remuneration?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  If yes? Give an answer (Please specify) 
 
 
 
Has section 54 notices affected investment? 
 
(1) @  Yes 
 
 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  Don’t know 
 
Please explain below if answer is Yes or No? 
 
 
Is section 54 notices positive or negative to the mining industry?  
 
(1) @  Yes 
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 (2) @  No  
 
(3) @  Yes and No  
 
Please explain why you picked that answer, below? 
 
END 
